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as bankers or as financial regulators. When workers extract intrinsic benefits from working in
regulation (such as public-sector motivation or human capital accumulation), our model jointly
predicts that bankers are, on average, more skilled than regulators and their compensation is more
sensitive to performance. During financial booms, banks draw the best workers away from the
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accumulate human capital and the best ones switch to banking in mid-career.
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“ Does it really matter who is in charge of the regulators? The grunt work of supervision
depends on more junior staff, who will always struggle to keep tabs on smarter, better-
paid types in the firms they regulate. ”
The Economist, September 30th 2010
The financial industry is heavily regulated. Whether it is in terms of spending or number of
employees, financial regulation represents more than a third of all business- and industry-related
regulation in the U.S. (see De Rugy and Warren (2009)), even though the financial sector contributes
to less than 10 % of the country’s GDP. Moreover, in many countries including the U.S., regulatory
resources devoted to the financial sector look set to increase (see, e.g., Acharya et al. (2010) and SEC
(2012)). However, many commentators express grave doubts about the current efficacy of financial
regulation (see, e.g., Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2012)). One strand of criticism, exemplified by the
quote above, is that, bluntly-put, financial regulators are not as smart as the bankers and traders
they are charged with overseeing. Although optimal financial regulation has justifiably received a
lot of academic attention (more on this later), very little has been done to understand the allocation
of the dominant input needed for regulation, that is, human capital.
The widely-held perception that financial regulators are less skilled than bankers is the central
motivating observation of our paper. In addition, two related observations are worth stressing.
First, the discrepancy in ability between regulators and bankers is believed to widen significantly
when the financial sector booms, or when regulatory resources shrink. Second, jobs in financial
regulatory agencies offer compensation that is low and insensitive to performance, relative to jobs
in the firms being supervised (see Philippon and Reshef (2012) and Henderson and Tung (2012)).
Together, these observations raise a number of questions. Why is the regulatory sector less prepared
to pay for skill relative to the private sector? Why does this discrepancy worsen when the financial
sector booms and how does this affect the efficacy of regulation? Is this allocation of workers
socially inefficient? And why do regulatory agencies make comparatively little use of performance
pay?
This paper gives a very parsimonious but perhaps surprising answer to these questions. We
show that if workers derive a utility benefit from working in regulation—due, for example, to
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public-sector motivation or to human capital benefits—then the labor-market outcomes described
above emerge naturally: in equilibrium, financial-sector regulators are less skilled, are paid less,
and receive less performance-sensitive pay. Put succinctly, the job that people intrinsically enjoy
more ends up with worse workers.
The notion that public-sector motivation represents an intrinsic benefit of working in regulation
can be illustrated by the following comments made by financial regulators in the U.K. and U.S,
respectively:
“ The work we do, aiming to make the financial sector more stable – consumer protection
– has a higher purpose than chasing a profit margin. (...) Some are motivated to work
for a higher purpose and job satisfaction.”1
“ ‘These are all people who could be making a lot more money doing something else,’ Ms.
Corsell said. Working at the SEC ‘is an opportunity to make policy and participate in
the way in which the financial system works and, at this point in time, is rebuilt. That’s
a pretty powerful draw to a lot of people.’ ”2
Consistent with these sentiments, regulatory agencies appeal explicitly to public-sector motivation
in their recruitment efforts.3 Moreover, a number of outside observers have commented on the
significance of public-sector motivation in financial regulation: see, e.g., Shiller (2012) [p.98] who
discusses the importance to financial-sector regulators of holding a job with a “broader mission”
and a “social purpose.” We are not aware of more systematic evidence on public-sector motivation
in the specific context of financial regulation, but an extensive empirical literature documents
the existence of public-sector motivation in a variety of public-sector jobs: see, e.g., Perry and
Hondeghem (2008) for a survey, or alternatively, the many sources cited in the growing economics
literature on public-sector motivation.4
1See “FSA: Regulator: ‘No, I don’t like being called an idiot”’ by Joris Luyendijk in The Guardian newspaper of
June 22, 2012.
2See “Budget battles could crimp SEC’s plans” by Mark Schoeff in Investment News of August 29, 2010. Ms.
Corsell is a former attorney in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investment management division.
3See, e.g., the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s career webpage at:
http://http://www.occ.treas.gov/about/who-we-are/careers/index-careers.html.
4See, e.g., Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999), Besley and Ghatak (2005), Francois (2007), Delfgaauw and
Dur (2008, 2010), Macchiavello (2008), and Jaimovich and Rud (2011).
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Although the public-sector motivation we refer to resembles altruism (see, e.g., Becker (1974)),
the intrinsic benefit workers extract from being regulators may also stem entirely from a desire
for power or any other non-pecuniary benefit; for our purposes, the distinction is unimportant.
We analyze in Section 4 an alternative example of intrinsic benefit stemming from working in
regulation: human capital accumulation. In particular, we show that low-skilled workers may
start in regulation because it offers the opportunity to build human capital; and that those workers
who successfully acquire human capital move to banking later in their careers. This corresponds
to the notion that working at the SEC, for example, may enhance an individual’s future career
prospects, consistent with deHaan, Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal (2012).
Naturally, other explanations for the labor-market patterns described in the opening paragraph
are possible. In particular, one might be tempted to ascribe these patterns to one of the fol-
lowing informal arguments: (A) political constraints determine pay in the public sector; or (B)
the private sector is significantly wealthier than the public sector.5 Our model speaks to both
of these alternatives. With respect to (A), we show that the labor-market patterns described
are constrained Pareto efficient, implying that any political constraints on compensation may be
non-binding. With respect to (B), our model shows this is not a necessary condition by delivering
the same predictions even when regulatory budgets are large relative to private-sector profitability.
We use our model of the financial-sector labor market to analyze how equilibrium misbehavior
responds to financial-sector booms and to reductions in regulatory resources. In both cases, and as
one would expect, the regulatory sector struggles to hire workers, and loses workers to the private
sector, consistent with the following excerpt from a recent Financial Times article:6
“Staff resignations doubled at the Financial Services Authority in the second quarter
as the government announced plans to split up the embattled regulator and as revived
private sector recruitment lured away managers and frontline supervisors.”
5Note that this second argument does not fully explain why the private sector is disproportionately attractive to
high-skill workers, nor why it makes more use of performance pay.
6See “FSA exodus adds to concern over regulation” by Brooke Masters in the August 8, 2010 issue of the Financial
Times.
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Perhaps less obvious, we show that it is the highest-ability workers that the regulatory sector loses.
Both effects make regulation less effective: there are fewer regulators, supervising more bankers,
and the average regulator is now less skilled. Consequently, equilibrium misbehavior by bankers
increases in financial-sector booms. Moreover, when the financial sector booms, larger bonuses are
paid there.
Relative to the literature on optimal regulation in financial markets, the main innovation of
this paper is to focus on the labor market for regulators. Accordingly, we model the regulatory
process in the simplest way possible that allows us to endogenize the allocation of talent across
regulated and regulating bodies. While our model remains silent on optimal deposit insurance
(see, e.g., Giammarino, Lewis, and Sappington (1993)), capital requirements (see, e.g., Morrison
and White (2005)), or the enforcement of financial contracts (see, e.g., Carlin and Gervais (2012)),
our paper still contributes to this literature by analyzing the social efficiency of a decentralized
labor market equilibrium in which the allocation of talent is tilted away from the regulatory sector,
consistent with the widely held view that financial regulators are less skilled than the bankers they
are in charge of monitoring. Since human capital is arguably the most important input needed for
regulation and banking, we believe that understanding (and potentially influencing) the economic
forces at work in this competition for talent could contribute to better regulation.
A burgeoning literature studies financial sector labor markets; we add to this literature by
analyzing which workers become regulators. For example, Axelson and Bond (2012) and Glode
and Lowery (2013) rationalize the high compensation offered to investment bankers and traders,
respectively through the channels of moral hazard and fixed-sum trading (neither of which we
study in this paper). In our model, we take the marginal product of financial sector workers (e.g.,
bankers or traders) as given, and focus on how the regulatory sector can compete with private
financial institutions to hire workers of different ability levels. The allocation of talent in finance
is also studied by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991), Philippon (2010), and Bolton, Santos,
and Scheinkman (2011). None of these papers, however, model the choice between working in
finance and in regulation. In contrast to these models where talent is inefficiently allocated, the
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equilibrium allocation of workers in our model—namely, higher skilled workers in finance and lower
skilled workers in regulation—is (constrained) Pareto efficient.
The dynamic extension of our model in Section 4, in which we study the revolving door between
regulation and the private sector, is related to Che (1995) and Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2011) who
study how employment opportunities in the private sector (i.e., at monitored firms) impact the
incentives faced by employees of monitoring agencies. Relative to these papers, our focus is on
which type of workers start in regulation and which type switch to the private sector in mid-career.7
More generally, our paper contributes to the study of non-pecuniary incentives8 and public-
sector employment.9 Our paper studies the combination of job-specific intrinsic motivation in
a labor market with heterogeneously-skilled workers. Specifically, we model the employment of
workers with different abilities in the public and private sectors, where public-sector employment
delivers a utility benefit. Delfgaauw and Dur (2008, 2010) study a related setting, but with
some important differences.10 First, the economic mechanism we identify is different (see detailed
discussion in Section 2). Second, the two sectors in our model are linked, while the sectors in these
previous papers function independently from each other. Third, these previous papers are silent
on incentive pay and human capital formation.11 In contrast, our model with risk-averse workers
makes predictions that are consistent with findings by Burgess and Metcalfe (1999) that incentive
pay systems are far more widespread in the private sector than in the public sector.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the general environment for our model
and Section 2 develops its main implications in a risk-neutral setting. In Section 3, we extend
our analysis to the case where workers are risk averse and derive predictions about the use of
7In both of these models, a worker’s probability of switching sectors is exogenous to the worker.
8See, e.g., Brennan (1994) and Carlin and Gervais (2009) for papers dealing with non-pecuniary incentives in the
specific context of corporate governance.
9In addition to the papers on public-sector motivation cited earlier, see also Prendergast (2003, 2007) for other
issues related to public-sector employment.
10Although Jaimovich and Rud (2011) study an economy with heterogeneously-skilled agents, they assume that
only high-skill agents are able to choose among occupations—bureaucracy and entrepreneurship—and so cannot say
anything about the skill composition of these sectors. Instead, they focus on the existence of multiple equilibria, and
in particular on the possibility that an inefficient public sector is self-reinforcing because inefficiency makes the return
from entrepreneurship low, and hence entrepreneurship unattractive. See also Macchiavello (2008) for a related
observation.
11Delfgaauw and Dur (2008) briefly consider a case in which effort is unverifiable. Since output is deterministic,
the contracts in this case are simple forcing contracts, which pay a worker only if output reaches some critical level.
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performance-pay in both sectors. We develop a dynamic version of our model and interpret the
intrinsic benefit of working in regulation as an improvement in human capital in Section 4. Section
5 discusses the robustness of our analysis and the last section concludes and highlights policy
implications resulting from our analysis.
1 Model
A continuum of workers can be employed by two types of risk-neutral employers: banks and reg-
ulatory agencies. There are two types of workers: a mass 1 of low-skill workers and a mass η of
high-skill workers. What differentiates these two types of workers is the probability of succeeding in
their work-related tasks. To avoid hard-wiring any particular allocation of workers into our model,
we assume that the probability of success for each worker type is the same in both jobs: qL for
the low-skill worker and qH for the high-skill worker, where qL < qH . Equivalently, we could allow
these success probabilities to change with the sector as long as the ratio of productivity for the
high type over the low type remains constant across sectors.
A banker’s job is to oversee investments in projects. Each banker deals with one project, and
there are at least 1 + η projects in the economy (so there are sufficiently many projects even if all
workers become bankers). A project’s outcome depends on how effectively the banker monitors it.
For simplicity, we assume that when a project is successful, it generates a net profit to the bank of
p (> 0) and when it fails the net profit is 0. (It would be straightforward to generalize our model to
one in which the payoff p from a successful project is replaced by P (n), a decreasing function of the
number of projects financed.) A banker’s skill affects his monitoring ability, which in turn affects
the probability that the project is successful: projects monitored by high-skill bankers succeed with
probability qH , while projects monitored by low-skill bankers succeed with probability qL.
A worker’s skill is only known by the worker himself. Hence, when approached by a bank,
workers are offered a menu of performance-contingent compensation contracts. Each menu item
is denoted wB = (wBS , wBF ), where wBS is the payment when the project is successful and wBF
is the payment when the project is a failure. By standard arguments, we can assume the menu
contains just two contracts, one intended for high-skill workers, wHB , and one intended for low-skill
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workers, wLB. The unobservability of skill is important for our results on pay-for-performance in
Section 3. However, it plays no role in our results for risk-neutral workers, since employers can
perfectly separate high-skill workers from low-skill workers by offering contracts that only pay in
the case of success. Under risk neutrality, this separation is achieved without any utility cost for
either the worker or employer, thus yielding an equilibrium outcome for which the unobservability
of skill is inconsequential.12
We assume there are at least two banks; Lemma 1 shows that this implies the standard result
that banks earn zero profits in equilibrium.
After becoming a banker, and also after learning whether his project has succeeded or failed, a
worker encounters an opportunity to misbehave for personal gain.13 This opportunity represents
anything that regulators are responsible for monitoring and preventing, such as defrauding small
entrepreneurs, a government agency, or the general public. This misbehavior imposes a deadweight
cost on the economy: formally, if the aggregate quantity of banker misbehavior is Q, the deadweight
social cost is κ (Q).
Let z denote a banker’s private gain from misbehavior. Workers do not know the exact value of
z when they choose a career, since the gains from misbehavior are determined by factors such as
the naivety of a banker’s clients and the efficacy of his supervisors. Accordingly, we assume that
z is distributed according to some continuous distribution function.
After learning how much he will gain from misbehavior, a banker chooses whether or not to
misbehave. In doing so, he compares the gain z with the cost of being caught and penalized
by regulators. Specifically, when effectively monitored by a regulator, misbehavior results in a
(possibly non-monetary) fine K for the banker, which may depend on z (if, e.g., the fine entails
repayment of fraudulent gains). We use r to denote the probability of being effectively investigated,
which is endogenously determined in equilibrium based on the number of regulators vs. bankers,
and the average skill of regulators.
12See also Lemma 3 for a formal statement.
13The assumption that the banker makes misbehavior decisions after learning whether his project has succeeded
or failed helps to simplify the analysis of the risk-averse version of our model.
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It is worth noting that the details of how we model bankers’ misbehavior have little impact on
our main results about worker allocation. What really matters is how much the opportunity to
misbehave is worth to workers, compared to the intrinsic benefit of working in regulation, when they
decide on a career. Our primary objective is to study how workers are allocated between sectors and
the current model of misbehavior allows us to characterize the feedback between workers’ allocation
and the quality of regulation, as measured by the equilibrium quantity r.
Our key assumption is that workers who become regulators receive an intrinsic benefit ∆, due
for example to the social recognition from acting as public servants, or as we illustrate in Section 4,
stemming from the acquisition of human capital useful in later stages of their careers. We assume for
now that such intrinsic benefit is outcome independent, or in other words, that it does not depend
on a worker’s skill level. We show in Section 5 that this assumption can be relaxed without
significantly affecting our results. Regulators investigate bankers to check if they misbehaved.
With probability qi a regulator of skill level i ∈ {H,L} determines the truth, i.e., whether or not a
banker misbehaved. We describe this outcome as a useful report, since the information generated
can be used to penalize the banker. With probability 1− qi the regulator learns nothing.
Parallel to banks, a regulatory agency offers workers a menu of two performance-contingent
compensation contracts
{
wHR , w
L
R
}
: for i ∈ {H,L}, wiR =
(
wiRS , w
i
RF
)
, where wiRS is the payment
for a useful report and wiRF is the payment otherwise. A regulatory agency aims to learn as much
as it can about the actions of bankers, so it aims to maximize the number of useful reports it can
generate, taking its budget as given. We assume there are at least two regulatory agencies, and
that the total budget of regulatory agencies, denoted by M , is equally divided among them.
Remark 1: A reader might wonder why we have assumed that regulatory agencies maximize
the number of useful reports, rather than some measure of social welfare. The main reason is that
maximization of social welfare would introduce an equilibrium effect into the regulatory agency’s
objective that we find unrealistic. To be more specific, if a regulatory agency aimed to maximize
social welfare, one possible way to do so would be to hire more workers, so that in equilibrium there
are fewer bankers, and hence less banker misbehavior. Essentially, this is regulatory employment as
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preemptive incarceration.14 Although this effect is present in our model, we believe its importance
in the real world is limited. Modeling the regulator agency’s objective as the maximization of useful
reports eliminates this problem. Moreover, in Subsection 2.2 we show that equilibrium outcomes
satisfy at least two different notions of social efficiency. Consequently, our analysis implies social
welfare may be maximized even if regulatory agencies do not have social welfare maximization as
their objective.
Remark 2: A reader might also wonder why we have assumed that there are multiple regulatory
agencies. The reason is that if we instead assumed there is only one regulatory agency, this agency
would then enjoy monopsonist power in the labor market for regulators, pushing down regulator
compensation. Because we want to highlight that our predictions about low regulator compensation,
and relatively unskilled regulators, are not driven by monopsonist power in the regulator labor
market, we prefer to assume that there are at least two competing regulatory agencies. However,
all our results would be qualitatively unchanged if there was only one regulatory agency.
Remark 3: Finally, we take the total regulatory budget M as exogenous. It would be straight-
forward to solve for the optimal M in a setting where the central planner, say the federal govern-
ment, attempts to maximize the total value created by bankers, net of penalty functions for the
incidence of misbehavior and the use of public funds. However, our main results do not depend
on the level of M , which has the advantage of making them positive rather than normative.
To simplify the presentation of our results, we make the very mild assumption that the total
regulatory budget M does not allow the regulatory sector to employ all workers.15 Formally:
Assumption 1 M < (ηqH + qL)
(
p− ∆qH
)
.
A worker’s utility from being a regulator is u (w + ∆). A worker’s utility from being a banker
is u (w + z −K (z)) if he misbehaves and is caught; u (w + z) if he misbehaves and is not caught;
and u (w) if he abstains from misbehaving. To eliminate wealth effects, which are tangential to
14Somewhat related, Glode and Lowery (2013) study how a trader’s compensation is partly determined by a bank’s
desire to prevent the trader from joining another bank and trading against the first bank.
15See the proof of Proposition 2 for details on how Assumption 1 guarantees that not all workers can be employed
as regulators.
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our main analysis, we assume that workers are either risk-neutral; or have constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA), i.e., u (c) ≡ −e−γc, where γ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
Define U i
(
wjB
)
as the expected utility for a worker of type i from accepting the banking
contract intended for type j. Likewise, define U i
(
wjR
)
as the utility for a worker of type i from
accepting the regulator contract intended for type j. Since we assume the misbehavior decision
takes place after the banker observes whether he has succeeded or failed,
U i
(
wjB
)
= qiEz
[
max
{
(1− r)u
(
wjBS + z
)
+ ru
(
wjBS + z −K (z)
)
, u
(
wjBS
)}]
+ (1− qi)Ez
[
max
{
(1− r)u
(
wjBF + z
)
+ ru
(
wjBF + z −K (z)
)
, u
(
wjBF
)}]
U i
(
wjR
)
= qiu(w
j
RS + ∆) + (1− qi)u(wjRF + ∆).
We focus on symmetric equilibria in which all regulatory agencies offer the same contracts,
and likewise, all banks do also. When multiple employers offer the same contract, we assume that
workers randomize among them with equal probability.
Labor market outcomes are summarized by the fraction of workers of each skill level who enter
each of the two sectors. For i ∈ {H,L}, let αi denote the fraction of workers with skill level i who
become bankers; hence a fraction 1− αi become regulators.
To close the model, we need to relate labor-market outcomes to the efficacy of regulators, that
is, to the equilibrium probability r of misbehavior detection. A parsimonious way to achieve
this is by first assuming that each regulator can monitor a measure λ > 0 of bankers and that
monitoring occurs successively, so that two useful reports are never produced on the same banker
(unless the number of regulators is so large that a useful report is produced on every banker). Write
N = αL+ηαH for the number of workers hired as bankers, and λR = λ
(
1− αL) qL+λη (1− αH) qH
for the number of useful reports produced by regulators. Since regulators do not know which
bankers misbehave until they have monitored them, the mass λ of bankers each regulator monitors
is randomly selected among the bankers with no useful reports. Hence, the regulatory sector
collects useful information about min {λR,N} of the N bankers. The probability that a given
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misbehaving banker will be penalized is then:
r = G (R,N) ≡ min {λR,N}
N
.
Remark 4: It is worth stressing that our results hold for many other parameterizations of the
misbehavior-detection function G; all we require is that G is continuous in its two arguments, weakly
increasing in the skill-adjusted mass of regulators R, and weakly decreasing in the total number of
bankers N . In particular, we show in Section 5 that these mild restrictions allow “congestion” or
“attention” effects to be incorporated into the misbehavior-detection process.
1.1 Equilibrium
Now, define Πi (wB) as a bank’s per-worker profits from employing a type-i worker using contract
wB. Define ρi (wR) = qiqiwRS+(1−qi)wRF as a regulatory agency’s productivity (i.e., the ratio of the
number of useful reports to expected compensation paid) from employing a type-i worker using con-
tract wR.16 For a regulatory agency that employs both types of worker, specifically, ki > 0 workers
of type i using contract wiR, define µ
i = ki
(
qiw
i
RS + (1− qi)wiRF
)
/
∑
j∈{L,H} k
j
(
qjw
j
RS + (1− qj)wjRF
)
as the fraction of the compensation paid to workers of type i; the regulatory agency’s overall pro-
ductivity is then
∑
i∈{L,H} µ
iρi
(
wiR
)
.
An equilibrium of our economy is defined as follows:
Definition 1 An equilibrium is vector
(
wHB , w
L
B, w
H
R , w
L
R, α
H , αL, r
)
satisfying:
• Labor market: utility maximization by workers among contracts.
– If αi > 0 (i.e., some workers of type i become bankers), then:
U i
(
wiB
) ≥ max{U i (wjB) , U i (wiR) , U i (wjR)} .
16If qiwRS + (1− qi)wRF ≤ 0, we define ρi (wR) =∞.
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– If αi < 1 (i.e., some workers of type i become regulators), then:
U i
(
wiR
) ≥ max{U i (wjR) , U i (wiB) , U i (wjB)} .
• For banks: There is no deviation {w˜HB , w˜LB} such that, taking all other contracts as fixed, the
bank strictly increases its profits.
• For regulatory agencies: There is no deviation {w˜HR , w˜LR} such that, taking all other contracts
as fixed, the regulatory agency strictly increases its productivity.
• Total regulatory expenditure equals the budget, M = (1− αL) (qLwLRS + (1− qL)wLRF ) +(
1− αH) η (qHwHRS + (1− qH)wHRF ); and the probability r that misbehavior is detected is con-
sistent with the labor market outcome, r = G
((
1− αL) qL + η (1− αH) qH ;αL + ηαH) .
The following result helps simplify the analysis. Unless otherwise stated, proofs are relegated
to the Appendix.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, banks extract zero profits from each type of worker they employ and reg-
ulatory agencies extract the same productivity from each type of worker they employ. Consequently,
the expected compensation of a banker of type i is qip; and there exists s such that the expected
compensation of a regulator of type i is qis.
It is important to note that these properties hold regardless of whether workers are risk-neutral
or risk-averse; the reason is that the result is driven by the objectives of the risk-neutral employers.
2 Equilibrium Allocation of Workers
In this section, we assume all workers are risk neutral. Consequently, a banker chooses to misbehave
whenever his payoff z exceeds the expected penalty rK(z), where, as introduced earlier, r is the
equilibrium probability of being caught when misbehaving. The aggregate incidence of misbehavior
in the economy is thenQ =
(
αL + ηαH
)
Pr (z > rK(z)), since αL+ηαH represents the total number
12
of bankers in equilibrium. To ease notation, we define φ(r) ≡ Ez [max (z − rK(z), 0)], representing
a banker’s expected payoff from the opportunity to misbehave.
How are workers allocated between the two sectors? A worker of type i is paid his marginal
product in banking (see Lemma 1). Given risk neutrality and the possibility of fraudulent gains,
his total expected utility from becoming a banker is qip+φ(r). Consequently, a regulatory agency
must offer a worker of type i an expected compensation of at least qip − (∆− φ (r)) in order to
attract that worker.
Before proceeding to our main result, it is worth pausing to consider the allocation of workers
in the benchmark version of our economy in which both intrinsic benefits and fraud are absent, i.e.,
∆ = 0 and φ (r) = 0 for any level of r.
Lemma 2 In the benchmark case with ∆ = 0 and φ (r) = 0, the allocation of workers is indeter-
minate: any αL, αH such that
(
1− αL) qLp+ (1− αH) ηqHp = M is an equilibrium outcome.17
However, when ∆ and φ (r) take different values, our model has something to say about the
allocation of workers across sectors. Our main result is that, whenever the benefit of regulation, ∆,
is larger than the net gain from misbehavior, φ(r), regulatory agencies hire high-skill workers only
after they have completely exhausted the supply of low-skill workers and some regulatory budget
remains. More formally, low-skill bankers and high-skill regulators cannot coexist.
To see this, suppose to the contrary that low-skill bankers and high-skill regulators coexist in
equilibrium. Write XiB = pqi for the expected compensation of type i in banking. Note that (by
above) a high-skill regulator must receive expected compensation of at leastXHB −(∆− φ (r)), and so
the regulatory agency’s productivity from this worker is at most qH
XHB −(∆−φ(r))
. Instead, a regulatory
agency could poach low-skill bankers by offering a contract paying just above X
L
B−(∆−φ(r))
qL
in the
case of success, and nothing after failure. Low-skill bankers would accept this contract, and the
regulatory agency’s productivity from these poached workers would be qL
XLB−(∆−φ(r))
.18 Whenever
∆ > φ (r), this productivity level exceeds the upper-bound on the productivity of existing high-skill
17An analogous result can be shown to hold for the case of risk-averse workers, considered in Section 3 below.
18Because workers are only rewarded for success, a regulatory agency’s productivity from high-skill workers who
accept this new contract is exactly the same as for low-skill workers.
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regulators,19 implying that regulatory agencies would benefit from poaching low-skill bankers (and
firing some of their existing high-skill workers). This contradicts the equilibrium assumption and
establishes:
Proposition 1 In any equilibrium with ∆ > φ(r), bankers are more skilled than regulators. For-
mally, there is no equilibrium in which some high-skill workers are regulators (αH < 1) and some
low-skill workers are bankers (αL > 0).
The intuition for Proposition 1 can be expressed as follows. Each worker who enters banking
pays a fixed utility cost of ∆−φ (r) relative to entering regulation. Net of this fixed utility cost, the
ratio of the productivity of low- and high-skill workers in banking is
qL−∆−φ(r)p
qH−∆−φ(r)p
, compared to simply
qL
qH
in regulation. The latter expression is the larger one when ∆ > φ (r), and so low-skill workers
have a comparative advantage in regulation. This comparative advantage is a consequence of the
intrinsic benefit; if instead ∆ = φ (r) = 0, low-skill workers do not have a comparative advantage,
since the ratio of productivities equals qLqH in both sectors.
20
A simple numerical example may also help to illustrate Proposition 1. Suppose high-skill
workers are twice as productive as low-skill workers, with qH = 2/3 and qL = 1/3; the payoff
from a successful project is p = 300; and the net utility gain from regulatory work, ∆ − φ (r), is
50. In this case, expected compensation for the two types in banking is 200 and 100 respectively.
19Note that in any equilibrium with low-skill bankers, XLB − (∆− φ (r)) ≥ 0, since if instead XLB − (∆− φ (r)) < 0,
a regulator could poach these workers and become infinitely productive.
20Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) study an economy with multiple worker types and observe that public-sector motivation
essentially lowers the marginal cost of the inputs for the public sector. It then follows that at the social optimum
the marginal product in the public sector should be lower. In their model, this in turn implies that the return to
skill is lower in the public sector, and hence the most talented workers should work in the private sector. Our paper
complements Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) by describing a different mechanism that pushes the most talented workers
into the private sector. In contrast to their paper, our mechanism does not rely on the marginal product being higher
in the private sector. So in particular, even if regulatory agencies are underfunded, and the marginal product of
regulatory resources is consequently high, our results still apply, and regulatory agencies are still best off using their
limited resources to employ lower-skilled workers.
In a related paper, Delfgaauw and Dur (2008) study a model with three types of worker, which are private
information to the worker: a benchmark type, a dedicated type that has a lower cost of effort in the public sector,
and a lazy type that has a higher cost. Dedicated workers display a form of public-sector motivation. As in our
model, and others, this implies that they can be paid less. If the public sector needs many workers, it hires a mix
of dedicated and lazy workers, since the contract offered to lazy workers is not very tempting for dedicated workers,
and so is not too distorting. This result has some overlap with Proposition 1; however, it does not predict that the
best workers in the economy end up in the private sector, which is an important component of Proposition 1.
In addition, both papers are silent on incentive pay and human capital formation, two topics we explore in detail
below.
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In particular, the high-skill worker receives twice as much, reflecting his higher productivity. In
contrast, a regulatory agency needs to pay expected compensation of at least 150 and 50 to attract
each of the two types. Since high-skill workers must be paid three times as much as low-skill
workers, but are only twice as productive, high-skill workers become regulators in equilibrium
only when regulatory agencies exhaust the entire supply of low-skilled workers and some budget
remains. In equilibrium, the most intrinsically attractive job—here, regulation—ends up with the
worst workers.
If some regulatory budget remains unused after the supply of low-skill workers is exhausted,
regulatory agencies then hire high-skill workers. In this case, the compensation of high-skill
regulators is determined by competition with the banking sector, so that high-skill workers are
indifferent between the two jobs. In contrast, regulatory agencies bid up the compensation of
low-skill workers until they have the same productivity per dollar of expected compensation as
high-skill workers, but low-skill workers strictly prefer working in regulation to banking.
It is worth highlighting that although large intrinsic benefits (i.e., ∆ > φ (r)) lead to an equi-
librium allocation of less-skilled workers to regulation, it does not follow that regulatory agencies
would wish to reduce the attractiveness of regulatory jobs by reducing ∆. Doing so would simply
increase the compensation they have to offer workers, and reduce their productivity, as measured
by the number of successful investigations per dollar of expected compensation. This observa-
tion generates a couple of immediate implications. First, to the extent that the outsourcing of
regulatory tasks to private agencies reduces ∆, such outsourcing is a bad idea.21 Second, a straight-
forward application of our results to purely private settings implies that private firms would gain
from taking steps to cultivate some form of esprit de corps, corporate identity or sense of mission;
indeed, many firms spend considerable resources on just such efforts. Our results imply that, to
the extent to which such efforts succeed, the result is that firms employ less talented workers; but
again, firms benefit from this, because such workers are cheaper.
21Besley and Ghatak (2001) show that when investments are non-contractible, projects that the government cares
more about than private parties should be left in the hands of the government. Our observation—that if outsourcing
tasks away from the public sector reduces the extent to which workers care about these tasks, then such outsourcing
is a bad idea—thus complements their analysis.
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In words, Proposition 1 says that the better job gets the worse workers. Here “better job”
corresponds to the condition that ∆ > φ (r). A parallel statement holds for the opposite case:
in any equilibrium in which banking is the better job, i.e., φ (r) > ∆, regulators are instead
more skilled than bankers. Although it is not usually regarded as a “conventional” labor market,
the allocation of talent between police forces and criminal organizations strikes us as a potential
example of this situation. In this case, criminals produce no output other than “misbehavior,” and
so p = 0. To the extent to which φ (r) > ∆ in this setting, our analysis then predicts that police
officers are more skilled than the criminals they “oversee.” More generally, although we focus on
the regulation of financial markets, which has received a lot of attention in recent years, our model
also applies to other enforcement situations. Thus, our paper should have implications for many
other sectors of the economy, as long as monitoring and monitored organizations require somewhat
similar aptitudes from their employees.
In equilibrium, the allocation of skilled workers is tilted towards the banking sector and, contrary
to the popular view, a high-value banking sector and a resource-scarce regulatory sector are neither
sufficient nor necessary conditions for this outcome. It is not necessary because in our model,
bankers are more skilled than regulators even when regulatory budgets are large compared to
profits in the banking sector, i.e., the public sector is wealthier than the private sector. It is not
sufficient because—and as noted above—if instead the expected gain from misbehavior is larger
than the intrinsic benefit ∆, then in equilibrium the most skilled workers become regulators.
For the remainder of the section we make the following assumption, which generates what we
believe is the empirically relevant case for financial regulation:
Assumption 2 The intrinsic benefit of regulation exceeds the expected gain from misbehavior even
with zero probability of punishment: ∆ > φ(0).
Assumption 2 ensures that ∆ > φ(r) and so any equilibrium is of the form of Proposition 1. The
reader should note that this assumption is stronger than we really need, since for most parameter
configurations the equilibrium detection probability r is strictly positive in any equilibrium and
the average gain from misbehavior is smaller than φ(0). Assumption 2 says that, given the ex
ante information available to workers when they choose a career, the value they expect to derive
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intrinsically from becoming regulators is greater than the expected utility they will derive from
misbehaving as bankers. It is important to stress that Assumption 2 is completely consistent with
a worker ex post encountering fraud opportunities with payoffs in excess of ∆.
Next, we prove the existence of an equilibrium along the lines described prior to Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 At least one equilibrium exists.
The proof of equilibrium existence consists of conjecturing a number of bankers n, and then
using Proposition 1 to construct a candidate equilibrium satisfying all equilibrium conditions except
for budget-balancing for regulatory agencies. This gives a mapping, W , from a candidate number of
bankers to a compensation bill for regulatory agencies. Any number of bankers n such that W (n)
matches the regulatory budget M constitutes an equilibrium. Recall that regulatory agencies
hire high-skill workers only if some regulatory budget remains unused after the supply of low-skill
workers is exhausted. Clearly W (1 + η) = 0, since in this case all workers are bankers and so
the regulator compensation bill is zero. At the opposite extreme, Assumption 1 guarantees that
regulatory agencies do not have the resources to hire all workers, i.e., W (n) > M as n → 0.
By the intermediate-value theorem, there exists at least one level of n such that the regulatory
compensation bill W (n) matches the budget M , and hence an equilibrium exists.22
Multiple equilibria are possible in our environment. The source of this multiplicity is that
ineffective enforcement makes banking sector employment more attractive, which in turn raises
the compensation regulatory agencies must offer—which reduces their capacity to hire staff, and
explains why enforcement is ineffective in the first place.23
When multiple equilibria exist, they can be ordered by the size of the banking sector. The small
banking sector equilibrium has a relatively large number of regulators. Consequently, enforcement
is effective, and bankers are largely deterred from misbehaving for private gain. This in turn reduces
22In a little more detail, W is a correspondence, but is single-valued everywhere except for n = η (i.e., all high-
skilled workers are bankers and all low-skilled workers are regulators). We handle this complication by making use
of a result in Milgrom and Roberts (1994).
23Mathematically, the source of equilibrium multiplicity is that the correspondence W discussed above may be
non-monotonic. The source of this non-monotonicity is that an increase in the number of bankers n, or equivalently a
decrease in the number of regulators, has two offsetting effects. On the one hand, employing fewer regulators reduces
regulatory agency expenditure. But on the other hand, employing fewer regulators means a lower probability r of a
misbehaving banker being penalized, and this increases the required compensation of regulators.
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the attractiveness of banking employment, which in turn reduces the compensation that regulatory
agencies must offer to attract workers—which is how the regulatory sector is able to afford to hire
a relatively large number of workers. Conversely, the large banking sector equilibrium has a small
number of regulators; consequently, enforcement is ineffective, and so many bankers misbehave and
the attractiveness of banking sector employment is relatively high; in turn, regulatory agencies
must offer generous compensation, and their budgets are quickly exhausted.
The possibility of multiple equilibria implies that, when comparing different regulatory juris-
dictions, one may observe very different levels of misbehavior even when fundamentals such as
regulatory resources are similar. The possibility of equilibrium multiplicity also implies that small
changes in regulatory resources or banking sector profitability may generate large changes in out-
comes, since small changes can lead to the disappearance of equilibria.
It is worth noting that the source of multiplicity in our model is different from the congestion
effects in enforcement that generate multiple equilibria in many enforcement papers (see related
discussion at the end of Section 5). Moreover, multiple equilibria arise even though Assumption
2 closes down an additional source of potential multiplicity. In particular, if this assumption is
weakened so that φ (0) > ∆ > φ (1), then there is the possibility of multiple equilibria arising
in which one equilibrium has many low skilled regulators who collectively produce reasonably
effective regulatory outcomes, so that ∆ > φ (r); but another equilibrium may also exist in which
regulators are more skilled but so few in number that regulation is ineffective, and so φ (r) > ∆,
which explains both why high-skilled workers are regulators, and why they are so expensive that a
regulatory agency is only able to hire a small number of them.
2.1 Comparative Statics
Comparative statics follow from the proof of equilibrium existence.
Corollary 1 As either the banking payoff p increases, or the total regulatory budget M decreases:
(a) some workers switch from regulation to banking and it is the most skilled regulators who switch,
(b) the probability that a given banker who misbehaves gets caught by regulators falls,
(c) the aggregate amount of misbehavior increases.
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If there are multiple equilibria, these statements are all true for the equilibria with the smallest and
largest banking sectors. If there is complete segregation of types (i.e., the number of bankers exactly
equals η) both before and after the change, all statements hold only weakly. In addition, (b) holds
only weakly if the detection probability is 1.
When the regulatory budget shrinks, fewer workers can be employed by regulatory agencies.
Alternatively, an improvement in the payoffs of banking projects leads to an increase in banker com-
pensation for any conjectured number of bankers, and thus an increase in regulator compensation,
resulting again in fewer regulators hired in equilibrium. Since in both cases the workers transfer-
ring from regulation to banking are either less skilled than the average initial bankers and/or more
skilled than the average remaining regulators, the average skill of workers in both jobs weakly falls.
The equilibrium probability r = G (R,N) that a misbehaving banker gets caught by regulators
then falls for two reasons. First, the number of bankers N , who need to be monitored, increases.
Second, workers are moving from the regulatory sector to the banking sector and these workers
are weakly more skilled than the remaining regulators, leading to a decrease in the number of
useful reports R. And unless the remaining regulators are still numerous enough to successfully
monitor all bankers, an act of misbehavior is less likely to be detected than before, implying that
the equilibrium level of misbehavior increases with the overall profitability of banking. Financial-
sector booms, when p increases, or regulatory budget cuts, when M decreases, are then associated
with periods of increased misbehavior.24
24These results are related to those in Povel, Singh, and Winton (2007) on the link between equilibrium mis-
behavior and business conditions. Their model focuses on firms soliciting capital from investors who can monitor
the information that firm managers disclose. The overall profitability of the sector affects investors’ beliefs about
the quantity of (bad) firms that might want to produce fraudulent information in hopes of being financed. The
endogenous monitoring of firms by investors then affects whether or not firm managers commit fraud. Our results
are instead driven by the labor market for financial workers. In our model, business conditions in the banking sector
dictate the compensation that banks offer to potential employees. The better compensation banks offer, the harder it
is for regulatory agencies to prevent skilled workers from leaving for the banking sector. As the number and average
skill of regulators decrease, the quality of the monitoring also decreases, making the expected cost of misbehaving
lower and misbehavior more prevalent in the banking sector.
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2.2 Welfare Analysis
Recall that we assumed that regulatory agencies maximize the number of useful reports, rather
than some measure of social welfare. Nonetheless, and as we show in this subsection, equilibrium
outcomes satisfy at least two different notions of social efficiency.
First, all equilibria lie on the feasible frontier of misbehavior-banking output combinations.
This is readily established. Consider perturbing an equilibrium allocation of workers by switching
a mass ε of high-skill bankers with a mass qHqL ε of low-skill regulators so that the aggregate output
of the banking sector remains unchanged.25 This switch also leaves the skill-adjusted mass of
regulators, R, unchanged. However, the number of bankers, N , increases, resulting in a weakly
lower probability of misbehavior detection, G (R,N), and a strictly higher incidence of misbehavior
in the economy.
Second, all equilibria also satisfy what we think is the relevant notion of Pareto efficiency. To
show this, we start by observing that, under risk neutrality, asymmetric information has no effect
on equilibrium outcomes. Indeed, note that asymmetric information played no role in the proof of
Proposition 1. In contrast, asymmetric information will have an effect when we consider risk-averse
workers in the next section. The reason asymmetric information has no equilibrium impact under
risk neutrality is that it is always possible for an employer to offer a contract that only one type
i ∈ {L,H} accepts, without imposing any inefficiency. Formally:
Lemma 3
(
wHB , w
L
B, w
H
R , w
L
R, α
H , αL, r
)
is an equilibrium if and only if there is an equilibrium of
the full-information economy with the same allocation of workers and the same utility levels.
Our main result of this subsection resembles the first welfare theorem, i.e., that any decentralized
equilibrium of our economy is Pareto efficient. Recall that, in establishing our results, we have
imposed no restrictions on the total budget M of regulatory agencies (beyond the mild Assumption
1). Consequently, our equilibrium characterization holds regardless of whether society spends
too much, or too little, on regulation. Accordingly, the appropriate notion of Pareto efficiency is
constrained Pareto efficiency, where the planner is constrained to allocations in which payments to
25By Proposition 1, it is impossible to switch low-skilled bankers with high-skilled regulators.
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regulators sum to exactly M . Otherwise, the planner is able to freely allocate workers to be either
bankers or regulators, after observing worker types, and to stipulate any transfers to and from both
workers and consumers (who are the victims of banker misbehavior).26 Here, the planner cannot
directly stipulate a level of banker misbehavior: instead, this is determined exactly as described
above, and in particular, by the detection probability function G.
Finally, we make the following assumption about the social value of banking:
Assumption 3 The banking sector appropriates all surplus from successful investments (which
equals p).
This assumption ensures that the size of the banking sector is not hardwired to be too large, or
too small, and that any inefficiency we may uncover in the decentralized equilibrium results from
the allocation of workers, the focus of this paper, rather than from the more obvious channel of
distorted investment choices by banks.
Our main result of this subsection is:
Proposition 3 Any decentralized equilibrium is constrained Pareto efficient.
Note that Proposition 3 is not an immediate consequence of the first welfare theorem because
regulatory agencies have a fixed budget and do not maximize profits. Indeed, it holds even though
the decentralized equilibrium entails banks imposing a negative externality on the ultimate victims
of banker misbehavior, who do not participate in setting labor-market contracts.
In brief, the argument behind Proposition 3 is the following. Consider a decentralized equilib-
rium. Because, by Proposition 1, regulatory agencies employ the cheapest—i.e., low-skill—workers,
a social planner’s only option—given the fixed budget M—is to decrease the size of the regulatory
sector and increase the size of the banking sector. But we know that, in equilibrium, banks can-
not profitably expand, even when they do not internalize the social cost of banker misbehavior.
Internalizing the cost of misbehavior only reinforces this observation, and implies that no increase
26We do not allow the social planner to stipulate ex ante lotteries in which a worker has some probability of being a
banker and some probability of being a regulator. The reason is that lotteries would allow a planner to pay regulators
in the lottery realization in which they become bankers, without these payments showing up in the regulatory budget.
21
in total social welfare is possible. Any allocation of workers that differs from the decentralized
equilibrium either makes some workers worse off or implies more misbehavior by bankers.27
3 Performance Pay
In this section, we analyze performance pay by relaxing the assumption that workers are risk neutral.
In particular, when workers are instead risk averse, our model implies that regulators receive less
performance pay than bankers, consistent with Henderson and Tung (2012). Moreover, we show
that when banking payoffs increase bonuses paid in the financial sector increase as well. In other
words, financial-sector booms do not simply increase base pay; they also affect performance pay.
Given the assumption of CARA utility, a banker who encounters an opportunity to gain z by
misbehaving chooses to do so if and only if the gain more than offsets the expected cost of the
penalty K (z), i.e.,
(1− r)u (z) + ru (z −K (z)) > u (0) . (1)
By defining
Φ (r) ≡ Ez
[
min
{
1, e−γz
(
1− r + reγK(z)
)}]
,
we can write a worker’s utility from banking, U i
(
wjB
)
, as28
U i
(
wjB
)
=
(
qiu
(
wjBS
)
+ (1− qi)u
(
wjBF
))
Φ (r) .
27To highlight the fact that Proposition 3 is not an immediate consequence of the first welfare theorem, it is worth
noting that it would not necessarily hold under the alternate parameter assumption that ∆ < φ (r). As discussed,
under this alternate assumption any decentralized equilibrium features low-skill workers as bankers and high-skill
workers as regulators. Because regulatory agencies now employ the most expensive workers, a social planner could
shrink the banking sector by replacing many low-skill bankers with a few of the high-skilled workers currently in
regulation. This switch is potentially socially beneficial because it reduces the number of bankers, and hence may
reduce the amount of banker misbehavior.
28Note that the ability to write U i
(
wjB
)
in this way is a consequence of our assumption that the misbehavior
decision is taken after a banker observes whether he has succeeded or failed. While this assumption facilitates our
analysis and exposition in the risk-averse setting, it is not required for any of our derivations in the risk-neutral
setting.
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Likewise, a worker’s utility from regulation, U i
(
wjR
)
, is
U i
(
wjR
)
=
(
qiu
(
wjRS
)
+ (1− qi)u
(
wjRF
))
e−γ∆.
Because of the CARA utility assumption, the utility the worker extracts from his job can be written
as the expected utility from consuming the chosen compensation contract times a multiplier that
either adjusts for the extra benefits from misbehaving as a banker or from working as a regulator.
Just as in the risk-neutral setting, whenever the intrinsic benefit of working in regulation ∆
is sufficiently large compared to the net payoff from the opportunity to misbehave, it is the least
skilled workers who become regulators.
Proposition 4 In any equilibrium with ∆ > − 1γ ln Φ (r), bankers are more skilled than regulators.
Formally, there is no equilibrium in which ∆ > − 1γ ln Φ (r), some high-skill workers are regulators
(αH < 1), and some low-skill workers are bankers (αL > 0).
Proposition 4 is identical to Proposition 1, but for the risk-averse setting. As before, it would
be straightforward to adapt the proof to establish the parallel result; if instead the average gain
from misbehavior is larger, then in equilibrium the most skilled workers become regulators. But
for the remainder of the section, we assume:
Assumption 4 The intrinsic benefit of regulation exceeds the expected gain from misbehavior even
with zero probability of punishment: −e−γ∆ > Ez [−e−γz].
Assumption 4 is equivalent to ∆ > − 1γ ln Φ (0), and hence ensures that ∆ > − 1γ ln Φ (r) and so
any equilibrium is of the form of Proposition 4. The reader should note, again, that Assumption
4 is stronger than what we really need, since for most parameter configurations the equilibrium
detection probability r is strictly positive in any equilibrium.
We now derive a result that is specific to the risk-averse setting, namely that the unobservability
of skill forces banks to offer compensation that is more sensitive to performance than that offered
by regulatory agencies. Because workers are strictly risk averse, by a standard argument any
equilibrium must entail full-insurance for low-skill workers. Focusing on regulation contracts,
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suppose to the contrary that in equilibrium a low-skill worker is not fully insured, i.e., wLRS 6= wLRF .
Then a regulatory agency could offer a new full-insurance contract, w˜RS = w˜RF = qLwLRS +
(1− qL)wLRF − ε, where ε > 0. Provided ε is chosen sufficiently small, a low-skill worker strictly
prefers this new contract to the equilibrium contract. Moreover, the contract strictly improves
the regulatory agency’s productivity when accepted by low-skill workers; and productivity is even
higher if it is accepted by high-skill workers. But this contradicts the supposition that the original
contract is part of an equilibrium. A parallel proof applies to banking contracts.
Given that low-skill workers are completely insured in equilibrium, high-skill workers cannot
be—that is, high-skill workers must receive some degree of performance-based pay. For the case
in which both high- and low-skill workers are bankers, this is again a standard argument, and is
easy to see. If high-skill workers were fully insured, they would receive exactly the same contract
as low-skill workers working in the same sector, since otherwise all workers would opt for the more
attractive of the two fixed-compensation contracts. But then profits would not be zero for both
types of workers in banking.29
The following result is then easily obtained:30
Proposition 5 In any equilibrium, compensation for regulation jobs is safer than for banking jobs:
either all regulators receive riskless compensation while some bankers do not, or all bankers receive
performance-based compensation while some regulators do not.
Here, the safer compensation contracts for regulation jobs are a direct consequence of the
equilibrium allocation of workers. When the intrinsic benefit of working in regulation exceeds the
expected misbehavior gain, regulatory agencies employ workers who are not as skilled as those that
banks employ. We also know that workers’ risk aversion coupled with adverse selection ensures that
low-skill workers receive safer compensation contracts. Consequently, compensation in regulation
is, on average, safer than compensation in banking as regulators are, on average, less skilled than
bankers, consistent with the description by Henderson and Tung (2012). Moreover, one could
29Moreover, performance pay in the high-skill banking contract wHB must take the form of more pay after success
than failure. The opposite (and counterintuitive) case wHBS < w
H
BF would violate the equilibrium condition, since
combined with UH
(
wHB
) ≥ UH (wLB) it would imply UL (wHB ) > UL (wLB) .
30The proof in the Appendix handles the case in which all bankers have high skill.
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interpret this result more broadly and conclude that the safe compensation that arises endogenously
in our model for the regulatory sector could take the form of superior long-run job security, also
consistent with Henderson and Tung (2012).
This result is different from the mechanism suggested by Dixit (2002). In his case, some workers
derive utility from exerting effort, and so need less performance pay. In our model, workers derive
utility from being regulators, not from exerting effort, per se. Yet, regulators receive compensation
that is less sensitive to performance than bankers because of a job selection mechanism. On average,
regulators are less skilled than bankers. This result originates from the incentive compatibility
condition for high-skill workers (bankers) and the risk aversion of low-skill workers (regulators).
An alternative explanation for the greater use of performance pay in banking could be that
output in regulation is less observable (or more generally, less contractible) than output in banking.
However, this ranking of output-observability across the two sectors is not at all obvious to us.
Nonetheless, if regulatory output really is more difficult than banking output to accurately measure,
then this would only reinforce our result.
Both Propositions 4 and 5 are predicated on an equilibrium actually existing. We show that
this is indeed the case, and at the same time, derive comparative statics. We relegate most of
the details to the Appendix. However, one point that is worth describing in more detail is the
determination of the level of compensation for regulatory workers.
The level of a banker compensation is easy to describe—by Lemma 1, expected compensation
simply equals the profit a banker is expected to generate for his employer. For the case in which the
banking sector is relatively large, regulator compensation follows easily: only low-skill workers are
employed by regulatory agencies, and their expected compensation is determined by the indifference
condition with the contract for low-skill bankers, which is a simple contract offering guaranteed
pay.
The case in which the banking sector is small—relative to the supply of high-skill workers—is a
little more complicated. As before, the expected compensation of high-skill bankers is determined
by the profits these workers produce. High-skill regulators must then earn an amount that makes
them indifferent between working in regulation and banking. Finally, regulatory agencies bid up
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the compensation of low-skill regulators to the point where regulatory agencies are equally satisfied
hiring the two different skill levels (see the proof of Proposition 6 in the Appendix for full details).
Our formal result is that an equilibrium exists whenever the number of high-skill workers η is
sufficiently low (as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)).31
Proposition 6 Provided the ratio of high-skill to low-skill workers η is not too large, at least one
equilibrium exists.
3.1 Comparative Statics
The intuition behind the comparative statics for the risk-averse setting is identical to that for the
risk-neutral setting.
Corollary 2 The comparative statics identified in Corollary 1 for the risk-neutral setting also hold
in the risk-averse setting.
As before, an improvement in banking payoffs leads to an increase in banker compensation
for any conjectured number of bankers, and hence to an increase in regulator compensation also.
Moreover, because of the performance-pay implication of risk aversion, we are also able to analyze
how performance pay responds to a financial boom.
Proposition 7 As the banking payoff p increases, the bonus compensation, wHBS −wHBF , that high-
skill bankers receive when their project is successful also increases in equilibrium.
When banking becomes more profitable and p increases, the zero-profit condition from Lemma 1
implies that bankers’ expected compensation must also increase. In order to keep high-skill bankers’
contracts unattractive to low-skill workers, the extra compensation high-skill bankers receive for
31The requirement that there are not too many high-skill workers is standard to the literature on competition
under adverse selection: see, for example, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In brief, the issue is that any candidate
equilibrium entails different contracts for high- and low-skill workers, and the contracts for high-skill workers offer
less than full insurance. So if most workers have high skill, the following deviation is profitable: offer a contract that
reduces the expected compensation of high-skill workers, but in return, features full insurance. All workers accept
this contract, and provided that there are enough high-skill workers, the increase in profits from these workers more
than offsets the losses from low-skill workers. As discussed by, for example, Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), there is
some dissatisfaction with this equilibrium non-existence result that arises when the high-skill type is numerous, and
a number of authors have offered possible solutions; see Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) for a recent example.
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having selected and monitored a successful project has to increase as well. Otherwise, the in-
crease in expected compensation would all come from the base compensation wHBF and low-skill
workers would then prefer a contract that targets high-skill workers, violating one of the incentive-
compatibility restrictions from the equilibrium definition. Consistent with the earlier discussion,
the relatively harder half of establishing Proposition 7 relates to the case in which the marginal
worker has high skill, and the employment contracts in the two sectors interact in a more compli-
cated way.
4 Human Capital Formation
So far we have assumed that workers enjoy an exogenous gain from working in regulation. In this
section, we impose more structure and analyze a two-period overlapping generation (OLG) model
in which the gains ∆ from working in regulation stem from the accumulation of human capital.
This corresponds to the notion that working at the SEC, for example, may enhance an individual’s
future career prospects, consistent with deHaan, Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal (2012). It also relates
to the broader idea in Che (1995) [p.379] that “[r]egulated firms need regulators’ unique expertise
to minimize the cost of complying with regulations.” The human capital interpretation of ∆ also
has the added benefit of making our model applicable to non-regulatory contexts, such as credit-
rating agencies, where one might be skeptical about the existence of direct utility benefits but
where workers acquire human capital that later makes them attractive to rated firms (as argued by
Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Xia (2013)). More generally, this extension highlights how our model
can be extended to allow for time variations in the non-pecuniary benefits of occupying a given job,
even if those variations are not due to the accumulation of human capital (for example, ∆ would
decrease if young workers are more idealistic about public service than are old workers).
The dynamic model below generates low-skill young workers entering regulation, while high-skill
young workers immediately become bankers. Some of the workers starting in regulation acquire
human capital, and then move to banking when old. Our model thus predicts the existence of a
“revolving door” leading from government to the private sector, consistent with empirical evidence
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from deHaan, Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal (2012) that approximately a third of SEC lawyers leave
to join the private sector; and moreover, that it is the relatively “tough” lawyers who leave.
As in Section 2, we assume that workers are risk neutral. This greatly simplifies the algebra and
allows us to focus on worker allocation issues at the cost of losing predictions about the sensitivity
of pay to performance.
There are many ways in which working in regulation may add to a worker’s human capital. For
example, a worker might develop political connections, learn about regulators’ practices, or acquire
knowledge useful for later stages of his career. To capture human capital accumulation while
preserving our convenient two-type model, we assume that all workers have some probability of
being high-skill when old, and some probability of being low-skill when old. Working in regulation
when young increases by θ (> 0) the probability of being high-skill when old. For now, we assume
that a worker’s skill levels when young and old are uncorrelated: all workers who start as bankers
have a probability α of being high-skill when old, while all workers who start in regulation have a
probability α+ θ of being high-skill when old. We return to this point in detail after we state our
main result.
Switching occupations in mid-career—i.e., moving from regulation to banking, or vice versa—
carries some cost. For example, the worker’s productivity may be negatively impacted; some
human capital may be lost; or the worker may simply suffer some direct disutility from moving.
The exact form of the cost is unimportant for our analysis, and so we assume simply that the
worker bears a cost c ≥ 0 from switching occupations in mid-career.
The gain from working in regulation when young, which we denote ∆y, can thus be expressed
as follows. Write V Ri and V
B
i for the expected utility of an old worker with skill i ∈ {H,L} who,
when young, worked in regulation and banking respectively. (A worker’s occupation when young
has a direct effect on utility when old because of the switching cost c.) Hence:
∆y = θ
(
V RH − V RL
)
+ α
(
V RH − V BH
)
+ (1− α) (V RL − V BL ) . (2)
That is, the effect of starting work as a regulator is a combination of the increased probability θ
of being high-skill when old (the first term of (2)), capturing human capital accumulation; and
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the consequences of switching costs on a worker’s occupation when old (the last two terms of (2)).
Note that because old workers are at the end of their careers and do not benefit from human capital
accumulation, they do not benefit from working in regulation, i.e., ∆o = 0.
Given our focus on human capital accumulation, our main purpose in this section is to show
how an equilibrium with ∆y > 0 and with young workers entering both sectors (consistent with
reality) easily emerges. We first conjecture that a banker’s expected gain from misbehavior is
dominated by human capital accumulation, i.e., ∆y > φ (r). Of course, this is an equilibrium
relation; we show below how it arises.
By Lemma 1, competition among employers implies that there exists an s such that a worker of
skill i earns qis per period when employed in regulation, and qip when employed in banking. The
conjecture ∆y > φ (r) then has two immediate but significant implications. First, young regulators
are less skilled than young bankers: this is just Proposition 1. Second, conditional on some young
workers being bankers, it must be the case that s < p.
All old workers would therefore earn more as bankers: the gain, including the additional benefits
from misbehavior as a banker, is pqi+φ (r)−sqi for a worker of skill i. Hence, no old worker would
switch from banking to regulation, even if c = 0. With a positive switching cost c, some workers
who started in regulation may prefer to remain there rather than switch to banking to earn a higher
wage. For example, if c is high, no worker would ever switch jobs in mid-career, which contradicts
the evidence on the existence of a revolving door. With a low c instead, old workers, who do not
extract the non-pecuniary benefit ∆y of working in regulation, would all work as bankers to collect
p rather than s. This scenario would thus give rise to an extreme version of a revolving door with
all workers who start in regulation switching to higher-paying banking jobs in mid-career. But
the fact that high-skill old workers have a larger incentive to switch to banking than do low-skill
workers allows our model to yield a third, potentially more realistic scenario with:
pqH + φ (r)− sqH ≥ c ≥ pqL + φ (r)− sqL, (3)
in which old workers who started as regulators switch if they are high-skilled, but not if they are
low-skilled.
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Proposition 8 There exist parameter values such that there is an equilibrium in which some young
workers start as regulators; and the subset of these workers who become high-skilled when old switch
to banking.
The proposition shows that our dynamic model can generate a revolving door between regulation
and banking, but it is only used by a fraction of the workers, that is, by the high-skill workers who
started their career in regulation. From the proof of this result, one can see that the key parameter
conditions are that switching costs c are intermediate, and the benefits from banking misbehavior
φ(·) are small.
Recall that we assumed that a worker’s skill level is uncorrelated over time: all workers who
start as bankers have a probability α of being high-skill when old, while all workers who start in
regulation have a probability α+ θ of being high-skill when old. It is however worth noting that a
positive correlation of skill over time would actually reinforce our results relating to the allocation
of low-skill workers to regulation, though at the cost of moving us away from the baseline model
in which the benefit of working in regulation is independent of type.32
The analysis in this section highlights how the option to switch to banking later in one’s career
lowers the cost of hiring young regulators. Part of the intrinsic benefit ∆y comes from the fact
that workers who start their career in regulation can later switch to banking if offered more money.
Recently, regulatory agencies and policy makers have discussed the idea of closing, at least partially,
the “revolving door” between the regulatory sector and the financial industry. Our model suggests
that closing the “revolving door” might have the unintended consequence of raising the cost of
hiring young regulators, which could potentially lower the overall productivity for the regulatory
sector.
In common with the existing economics literature,33 our discussion of the revolving door between
public and private service is focused on movements from the public to the private sector. However,
32Assume now that workers who are high-skill when young have a higher probability, αH say, of being high-skill
when old. From expression (15) derived in the proof of Proposition 8 (see Appendix), one can see that this assumption
would result in ∆y varying with the worker’s type when young. The assumption that αH > α implies that high-skill
young workers would benefit less from working in regulation than before. To see this, observe that (15) is decreasing
in α by inequality (3): the cost of switching to banking when an old worker has high skill exceeds the compensation
disadvantage of a low-skill old-worker remaining in regulation.
33See, e.g., Che (1995), Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2011), Blanes i Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen (2012), deHaan,
Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal (2012), and Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Xia (2013).
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it is worth noting that our central assumption of public-sector motivation can also provide a very
natural explanation of the other half of the revolving door, namely the movement from the private
sector to the public sector. Although a full exploration of this idea is beyond the scope of the
current paper, we briefly sketch the main idea.
In our earlier analysis, we deliberately abstracted from wealth effects in occupation choice, by
using a combination of CARA preferences and specifying utility as u (c+ ∆), so that public-sector
motivation generates the same dollar-equivalent increase in utility for all workers. However, a
natural extension of our model would be to allow for wealth effects, by, for example, specifying
utility as u (c) + ∆. Under this specification, the utility gain from public-sector employment has a
higher dollar-value for wealthier workers. Consequently, workers who are successful and grow rich
in the private sector may end their careers by moving to the public sector. This effect is related to
the effect noted in dynamic contracting papers such Spear and Wang (2005) and Sannikov (2008),
when an agent with utility that is additively separable in consumption and leisure may eventually
grow too wealthy to incentivize effectively, and so “retirement” is optimal. Here, “retirement”
takes the form of public-sector employment.34
5 Robustness
For transparency and analytical tractability, we have made the simplifying assumptions that there
are just two skill levels and that workers are homogeneous with respect to the intrinsic benefit of
working in regulation.
The assumption of two skill levels is easily relaxed under either risk neutrality or full-observability
of skill, and our results generalize exactly as one would expect, but generate no significant new in-
sights: there is a cutoff skill-level above which workers are bankers, and below which they work
for regulatory agencies. Our results admittedly rely on some substitutability between workers of
different skill levels. Clearly if no such substitution is possible, then the skill mix in the two
34A multi-period model with risk-averse workers and observable worker skill would be relatively straightforward to
analyze. (As noted in Lemma 3, the observability of skill does not affect outcomes when workers are risk neutral.)
However, a multi-period model with risk-averse workers and unobservable worker skill might generate the following
countervailing effect: starting in regulation would be a negative signal, making promotion to banking more difficult.
We leave a fuller exploration of this effect for future research.
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occupations is essentially technologically determined. For analytical convenience we have assumed
perfect substitutability, but this is not essential for our results.
The assumption of homogeneity of the intrinsic benefit is easily relaxed in the cases of risk
neutrality or full-observability of skill. What matters then is the intrinsic benefit of the worker
who is indifferent between the two occupations, and provided this “marginal-type” intrinsic benefit
is positive, our results are qualitatively unchanged.35 Economically, the intrinsic benefit of the
marginal worker is positive whenever the number of workers in the economy who derive an intrinsic
benefit from regulation exceeds the equilibrium number of regulators. When this condition is met,
regulators have relatively low skill, as in the homogenous benefit case. Moreover, heterogeneity
implies that, in equilibrium, most regulators strictly prefer their job to working in banking, since
their intrinsic benefit exceeds that of the marginal type. A final point worth making in this regard
is that a worker’s intrinsic utility from regulation is likely to be negatively correlated with the
same worker’s net benefit from misbehaving as a banker. For example, a worker who values public
service may well suffer disutility from misbehaving as a banker. Negative correlation of this type
makes Assumption 2 more likely to hold.
One special but important case of heterogeneity in the intrinsic benefit is that in which regulators
care about how many useful reports they produce. In other words, the intrinsic benefit may
be partially output-dependent, instead of completely output-independent as we have previously
assumed. If regulators place a value d on useful reports, the total intrinsic benefit of a worker of
skill i ∈ {H,L} is ∆ + qid, where ∆ is the output-independent component. The next proposition
shows that the addition of the output-dependent component qid to the intrinsic benefit does not
change the logic behind the model’s central prediction. As long as ∆ > φ(r) and d ≤ p, regulatory
agencies hire high-skill workers only after they have completely exhausted the supply of low-skill
workers and some regulatory budget remains.
35Generalizing our model in the case of risk aversion and asymmetric information about skill is considerably harder.
In particular, establishing equilibrium existence for more than two skill levels becomes significantly harder; while
dealing with two dimensions of unobserved type—i.e., both skill and intrinsic benefit—would introduce substantial
extra complexity.
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Proposition 9 Suppose d ≤ p. Then in any equilibrium with ∆ > φ(r), bankers are more skilled
than regulators. Formally, there is no equilibrium in which some high-skill workers are regulators
(αH < 1) and some low-skill workers are bankers (αL > 0).
Moreover, a similar argument implies that this result is also robust to the gains from misbehavior
φ(r) being linearly dependant of a worker’s skill qi. Specifically, when the fixed benefit of regulation,
∆, is larger than the fixed component of gains from misbehavior, say φ(r), regulators hire high-
skill workers only after they have completely exhausted the supply of low-skill workers and some
regulatory budget remains.
Our central result on the allocation of workers to occupations also holds when bankers do not
extract the full surplus p in equilibrium. The proof of Proposition 1 makes use only of the property
that the expected compensation in banking of a worker of skill i, i.e., XiB, net of the utility loss of
being a banker, satisfies:
XHB − (∆− φ (r))
XLB − (∆− φ (r))
≥ qH
qL
. (4)
In particular, under Assumption 2 a sufficient condition for this inequality is that
XHB
XLB
≥ qH
qL
. (5)
In the case with full banking competition, where bankers receive all the surplus, XiB = pqi, in-
equality (5) holds with equality. At the same time, inequality (4) also holds under other labor
market assumptions. For example, the sufficient condition (5) holds strictly if banks incur a fixed
cost a > 0 from employing each banker, so that XiB = pqi − a. It also holds if banker com-
pensation is determined in a standard bargaining game, where the outside option of workers is
proportional to their skill. In this case, XiB +φ (r) = β (pqi + φ (r)) + (1− β)Oi, where β ∈ [0, 1] is
a bargaining-power weight and Oi is the worker’s non-banking outside option, and by assumption
OH/OL = qH/qL. A potentially important determinant of banker compensation here could be the
outside option to work as a regulator, which is however not proportional to skill. If both skill
types are employed as regulators, then from Lemma 1, Oi takes the form Oi = qis+ ∆, for some s.
Hence XiB = (βp+ (1− β) s) qi + (1− β) (∆− φ (r)), so that (4) is satisfied, although (5) is not.
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Of course, there are also situations in which inequality (4) does not hold, and in these cases, the
conclusion of Proposition 1 may no longer hold. A simple example is if banking compensation is
determined by bargaining, and a worker’s outside option O¯ is independent of skill and large enough,
i.e., XiB + φ(r) = β(pqi + φ(r)) + (1− β) O¯, with O¯ > (∆− βφ (r)) / (1− β).
Finally, in the benchmark specification of the misbehavior-detection function G an individual
banker’s probability of being penalized for misbehavior is independent of how many other bankers
are misbehaving. This property may not hold in practice. For example, an increase in aggregate
misbehavior may attract regulator attention, increasing an individual banker’s probability of being
penalized. Alternatively, there may be “congestion” effects in the punishment of banker misbe-
havior, generating the opposite effect. However, it is possible to allow for effects of this type while
satisfying the restrictions on G, as we next show.
Write ν for the fraction of the N bankers who misbehave. The probability of a penalty being
imposed can be expressed as
r = F (R, νN) ,
where we assume that F is continuous, and increasing in the skill-weighted number of regulators
R. The sign of the derivative of F with respect to νN could be either positive (the “attention”
effect), or negative (the “congestion” effect).
Given risk-neutral or CARA preferences, the probability that an individual banker misbehaves
is determined solely by the penalty probability r, and we denote this probability by the (decreasing
function) f (r). The penalty probability is thus given by the solution to the fixed point problem
r = F (R, f (r)N) . (6)
Note that N and R are effectively parameters of the fixed-point problem (6); hence one can write
the solution to (6) as
r = G (R,N) ,
which coincides with our main specification of the model. Provided that the derivative of F with
respect to νN is either positive, or not too negative, i.e., allowing either for “attention” or for mild
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“congestion” effects, then r − F (R,Nf (r)) is strictly increasing in r, and the equilibrium in the
misbehavior game, where r−F (R,Nf (r)) = 0, is unique and the G function behaves as needed.36
6 Conclusion
We propose a labor market model in which workers with heterogenous ability levels can choose to
work as bankers, investing in projects with risky payoffs, or as regulators, monitoring the behavior
of bankers. The model allows us to shed light on the interactions between the financial labor
market, the profitability of the financial sector, and its degree of misbehavior. Our model jointly
endogenizes the occupational choice of workers and the compensation contracts offered in the two
sectors. When the intrinsic benefit from working as a regulator (e.g., recognition for being a public
servant) is greater than the ex ante benefit a banker can expect to extract through fraud or other
types of misbehavior, bankers are, on average, more skilled than regulators and their compensation
is more sensitive to performance. We show that when the financial sector booms banks draw the
best workers away from the regulatory sector and equilibrium misbehavior by bankers increases. In
a dynamic extension of our model, young regulators accumulate human capital and the best ones
switch to banking mid-career.
Our analysis provides insights for policy makers in the government and in financial regulatory
agencies about competitive labor market forces at play. Our model shows that increasing the
budget of regulatory agencies would not prevent a situation where bankers are, on average, more
skilled than regulators. Allocating more resources to these regulatory agencies would allow them
to increase the quantity of supervision they provide as they would hire away from banks some of
their less skilled workers. These workers, when considering the compensation regulatory agencies
need to pay them, would be the most productive workers to hire away from the banking sector and
consequently the skill inequality between the regulatory sector and the banking sector would persist
36The complication that arises with severe congestion effects in the penalty probability is that there may be multiple
equilibria in misbehavior, even taking as given a distribution of workers across occupations; that is, (6) may have
multiple solutions. (Hence this is a different form of multiplicity from the one discussed in Section 2.) This
equilibrium multiplicity is standard in the crime literature (see, e.g., Bond and Hagerty (2010) and the references
therein): a banker may misbehave if and only if many other bankers are misbehaving and his probability of being
penalized is consequently low. With severe congestion effects, G could become discontinuous.
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despite the larger regulatory budgets. Our model shows that regulatory agencies prioritizing the
hiring of low-skill workers is socially efficient when the intrinsic benefits from working in regulation
are large. It is, however, important to highlight that the intrinsic benefits that trigger this skill
inequality improve the productivity of the regulatory sector, thanks to the resulting savings in
labor costs, and regulatory agencies should not try to eliminate them. In that sense, our model also
highlights that preventing regulators from switching to banking (i.e., closing the “revolving door”)
during their career would reduce the human capital benefits of starting career in regulation, increase
the cost of hiring young regulators, and potentially make the regulatory sector less productive.
The appropriate regulation of financial markets has long been a topic of considerable importance,
in academia and in practice. This paper adds to the existing literature by analyzing which workers
are best suited to work in financial regulation, both positively and normatively. It is worth
noting that even though we have focused on financial regulation, our results on the allocation of
talent and on the efficacy of enforcement potentially apply to other sectors of the economy where
regulation and the primary activity being regulated require broadly similar knowledge and training.
Regulation of offshore oil production is one obvious and important example. Our results that deal
specifically with the allocation of talent across sectors can also be applied to non-regulatory settings;
for example, they provide a simple and novel explanation of the popular wisdom that “those who
can, do; those who can’t, teach.”
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: To prove the statement about banker compensation, suppose to the contrary
that an equilibrium exists in which banks extract strictly positive expected profits from a worker
of type i. Let wLB and w
H
B be the equilibrium banking contracts.
There cannot be an equilibrium in which a bank expects strictly positive profits from both
types, i.e., ΠL
(
wLB
)
> 0 and ΠH
(
wHB
)
> 0, since in this case a bank can profitably deviate by
making both contracts slightly more attractive for workers and capturing the whole market. So
the bank must make weakly negative profits from type j 6= i. (This includes the case in which all
workers of type j are in regulation.)
Next, let w˜iB be a single contract that strictly improves the utility of type i relative to w
i
B, but
strictly worsens the utility of type j relative to wiB. Because the success probabilities differ, one can
always construct such a contract, and moreover, can ensure that the profits Πi
(
w˜iB
)
are arbitrarily
close to the profits Πi
(
wiB
)
> 0. It is then a strictly profitable deviation for a bank to offer a single
contract, w˜iB, in place of the menu of contracts,
{
wHB , w
L
B
}
, as follows. By construction, type i
accepts the contract, and Πi
(
w˜iB
)
> 0. Moreover, type j does not accept the contract, since in the
conjectured equilibrium he is at most indifferent between selecting wiB and some other contract,
which remains available; and U j
(
w˜iB
)
< U j
(
wiB
)
. The existence of a strictly profitable deviation
contradicts the equilibrium definition, and establishes that banks extract zero profits from each
type of worker employed in equilibrium.
The proof of the statement about regulator compensation is similar. Suppose an equilibrium
exists in which regulatory agencies hire both types of workers but extract strictly higher productivity
from type-i workers than type-j workers. Let wHR and w
L
R be the equilibrium regulator contracts.
Let w˜iR be a single contract that strictly improves the utility of type i relative to w
i
R, but strictly
worsens the utility of type j relative to wiR; as above, because the success probabilities differ, one
can always construct such a contract, and moreover, can do so such that ρi(w˜iR) is arbitrarily
close to ρi(wiR). A regulatory agency could then strictly improve its productivity by deviating and
offering the single contract, w˜iR, in place of the menu of contracts,
{
wHR , w
L
R
}
. This contradicts
the equilibrium condition, and so establishes that in any equilibrium in which regulatory agencies
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employ both worker types, they extract the same productivity from both types, i.e., there exists s
such that
1
s
=
qH
qHwHRS + (1− qH)wHRF
=
qL
qLwLRS + (1− qL)wLRF
.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2: Let αL and αH satisfy the condition stated in the lemma. For types
i ∈ {H,L} and occupations j = {B,R}, let wij be the contract paying p after success and 0 after
failure. It is straightforward to check that all the equilibrium conditions from Definition 1 are
satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 1: See paragraph that precedes proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2: For each possible number of bankers n ∈ (0, 1 + η), we construct a
candidate equilibrium that satisfies all the equilibrium conditions other than the regulatory budget
constraint. We then calculate the regulatory sector’s total compensation bill in each candidate
equilibrium. Finally, we use a version of the intermediate-value theorem to show that at least one
candidate equilibrium satisfies the regulatory budget constraint.
For each candidate number of bankers n, Proposition 1 determines the skill levels of all bankers
and regulators, i.e., all bankers are high-skilled if n ≤ η, all regulators are low-skilled if n ≥ η. Given
the allocation of workers, it is straightforward to compute the misbehavior detection probability r.
Candidate equilibrium for n ∈ (0, η), when marginal worker has high skill. From Lemma 1, high-
skill bankers receive expected compensation of qHp. Since some high-skill workers are employed by
regulatory agencies, the expected compensation of high-skill regulators is qHs, where s = p−∆−φ(r)qH ,
and hence (by Lemma 1) the expected compensation of low-skill regulators is qLs. The bank and
regulatory agency equilibrium conditions are satisfied since if either employer reduces compensation
for workers of type i, it will lose type-i workers (for regulatory agencies this is a bad outcome since
productivity is the same across the two worker types); and banks cannot profitably poach low-skill
workers, since they would have to pay them an expected compensation of qLs + ∆ − φ(r) > qLp.
Finally, if the above expected compensations are delivered by the simple contracts
(
wiBS , w
i
BF
)
=
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(p, 0) and
(
wiRS , w
i
RF
)
= (s, 0) for types i ∈ {H,L}, the self-selection equilibrium condition is
satisfied since, by construction, high-skill workers are indifferent, i.e., qHs+ ∆ = qHp+ φ (r), and
slow-skill workers strictly prefer the regulation contract given that p > s by Assumption 2.
Candidate equilibrium for n ∈ (η, 1 + η), when marginal worker has low skill. From Lemma 1,
high- and low-skill bankers receive expected compensation of qHp and qLp respectively. Since
some low-skill workers are employed by regulatory agencies, the expected compensation of low-skill
regulators is qLs, where s = p − ∆−φ(r)qL . The bank and regulatory agency equilibrium conditions
are satisfied since if either employer reduces compensation for workers of type i, it will lose type-i
workers; and regulatory agencies cannot profitably poach high-skill workers, since they would have
to pay them an expected compensation of qHp− (∆− φ(r)) > qHs, meaning productivity is lower
than that of existing regulators. Finally, if the above expected compensations are delivered by
the simple contracts
(
wiBS , w
i
BF
)
= (p, 0) and
(
wiRS , w
i
RF
)
= (s, 0) for types i ∈ {H,L}, the self-
selection equilibrium condition is satisfied since, by construction, low-skill workers are indifferent,
qLs+ ∆ = qLp+ φ (r), and high-skill workers strictly prefer the banking contract given that p > s
by Assumption 2.
Candidate equilibrium for n = η, with complete separation of types. From Lemma 1, high-skill
bankers receive expected compensation of qHp. For low-skill regulators, any expected compensation
qLs ∈
[
qL
(
p− ∆− φ(r)
qL
)
, qL
(
p− ∆− φ(r)
qH
)]
(7)
is a candidate equilibrium outcome, as follows. The lower end of this interval is exactly the expected
compensation that makes it impossible for banks to profitably poach low-skill regulators. Likewise,
the upper end of the interval is exactly the expected compensation that prevents regulatory agencies
to gain from replacing their low-skill workers with high-skill workers poached from banks. Finally,
if the above expected compensations are delivered by the simple contracts
(
wiBS , w
i
BF
)
= (p, 0)
and
(
wiRS , w
i
RF
)
= (s, 0) for types i ∈ {H,L}, the self-selection equilibrium condition is satisfied
since high-skill workers do not become regulators and low-skill workers do not become bankers:
qHp+ φ(r) ≥ qHs+ ∆ and qLp+ φ(r) ≤ qLs+ ∆.
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Equilibrium existence. We next define functions W¯ and W as follows. For any n ∈ (0, η)∪(η, 1+η),
define W¯ (n) = W (n) as the total regulatory compensation bill associated with the candidate
equilibrium characterized above, i.e.,
W¯ (n) = W (n) =

{
((η − n) qH + qL)
(
p− ∆−φ(r)qH
)}
if n ∈ (0, η){
(1 + η − n) qL
(
p− ∆−φ(r)qL
)}
if n ∈ (η, 1 + η)
Define W¯ (0) = W (0) = limn→0 W¯ (n) and W¯ (1 + η) = W (1 + η) = limn→1+η W¯ (n). Finally,
define W¯ and W at η by
W¯ (η) = lim
n↗η
W¯ (n)
W (η) = lim
n↘η
W (n) .
Observe that, by Assumption 2, W¯ (η) ≥W (η).
For any constant C > 0, define the functions ψ¯ and ψ by
ψ¯ (n) = C
(
W¯ (n)−M)+ n,
ψ (n) = C (W (n)−M) + n.
By Assumption 1, W¯ (0) = W (0) > M . Moreover, W¯ (1 + η) = W (1 + η) = 0. Consequently,
it is possible to choose the constant C > 0 sufficiently small such that both ψ and ψ¯ map the
closed interval [0, 1 + η] into itself. Note that ψ¯ (n) ≥ ψ (n) for all n. Define the correspondence
ψ (n) =
[
ψ (n) , ψ¯ (n)
]
. By construction, ψ is continuous but for upward jumps in the sense of
Milgrom and Roberts (1994). Hence by Corollary 2 of Milgrom and Roberts (1994), ψ has at least
one fixed point.
Any fixed point of ψ is an equilibrium, as follows. Since W¯ (0) = W (0) > M , and W¯ (1 + η) =
W (1 + η) = 0, all fixed points lie in the interior of [0, 1 + η]. If a fixed point n lies strictly below
(respectively, above) n, then W¯ (n) = M , and corresponds to an equilibrium in which the marginal
worker has high (respectively, low) skill. If the n = η is a fixed point, then n ∈ [C (W (n)−M) +
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n,C
(
W¯ (n)−M)], which is equivalent to M ∈ [W (n) , W¯ (n)], which is equivalent to condition
(7) above. In this case, the fixed point corresponds to an equilibrium with complete separation of
types.
Proof of Corollary 1: The proof uses the machinery already in the proof of Proposition 2.
The functions ψ (·) and ψ¯ (·) defined there are strictly increasing in p and strictly decreasing in M .
Hence by Corollary 2 of Milgrom and Roberts (1994), the size of the banking sector in the equilibria
with the smallest and largest banking sectors are weakly increasing in p and weakly decreasing in
M , establishing the first half of part (a).
The second half of part (a) is immediate from equilibrium characterization result Proposition
1. Part (b) follows from part (a): the number of bankers is larger, and the skill-weighted number
of regulators is smaller. Part (c) then follows immediately from parts (a) and (b).
Finally, the statement that these relations are all strict for equilibria n 6= η follows from the
fact that both ψ (·) and ψ¯ (·) are strictly increasing in p and strictly decreasing in M .
Proof of Lemma 3: “Only if” is immediate from the fact that, given risk neutrality, both banks
and regulatory agencies are able to offer contracts that are accepted by only one type, and deliver
arbitrary utility to a worker without entailing any inefficiency. For the “if” part, note that Lemma
1 and Proposition 1 hold for full-information economies also. The fact that any equilibrium
outcome of the full-information economy can also be supported as the equilibrium outcome of the
asymmetric information economy then follows from the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3: Fix a decentralized equilibrium. Write r for the equilibrium detection
probability, and n for the equilibrium number of bankers. By Lemma 1, there is an s such that
worker type i gets pqi + φ (r) as a banker and sqi + ∆ as a regulator. Observe that s > 0, since
otherwise regulatory agencies could hire all workers without exhausting their budget M , which
cannot be an equilibrium.
Suppose that, contrary to the claimed result, there exists a Pareto superior alternative alloca-
tion. Relative to the decentralized equilibrium, in the new allocation, εL and εH low- and high-skill
workers are moved from banking to regulation; and δL and δH low- and high-skill workers are moved
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from regulation to banking. Arbitrary payments are allowed in the new allocation, subject to the
constraint that total payments to regulators equal M .
Write A for the increase in utility experienced by the subset of workers who are regulators in
the new allocation. By the supposition that the new allocation is Pareto superior, A ≥ 0. In the
new allocation, the combined utility of these workers is simply
M +
(
1 + η − n−
∑
i
δi +
∑
i
εi
)
∆.
In the decentralized equilibrium, the εi workers of type i who were switched, for the alternative
allocation, from banking to regulation received pqi + φ (r), while the 1 + η − n −
∑
i δi who are
regulators in both the new and old allocations received a combined utility of
M −
∑
i
δisqi +
(
1 + η − n−
∑
i
δi
)
∆.
So
A = M +
(
1 + η − n−
∑
i
δi +
∑
i
εi
)
∆−
∑
i
εi (pqi + φ (r))
−
(
M −
∑
i
δisqi +
(
1 + η − n−
∑
i
δi
)
∆
)
,
which simplifies to
A =
∑
i
δisqi −
∑
i
εi (pqi + φ (r)−∆) . (8)
Observe that εi > 0 is possible only if the decentralized equilibrium featured type-i workers in
banking; but in this case, pqi + φ (r) ≥ ∆ + sqi, since otherwise a regulatory agency could strictly
increase its number of useful reports by deviating and offering a contract that would attract these
workers away from banking. Consequently,
∑
i δisqi −
∑
i εisqi ≥ A ≥ 0, and since s > 0, this
implies that the number of useful reports must be lower in the new allocation, i.e.,
(εH − δH) qH + (εL − δL) qL ≤ 0. (9)
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In the decentralized equilibrium either all low-skill workers are in regulation, or all high-skill workers
are in banking. Consequently, either εL = 0 or δH = 0, and so inequality (9) implies that the new
allocation has more bankers,
∑
i εi −
∑
i δi ≤ 0.
Write n′ = n −∑i (εi − δi) for the number of bankers in the new allocation, and r′ for the
misbehavior detection probability in the new allocation. As noted, the new allocation has more
bankers, n′ ≥ n; and since there are more bankers and fewer useful reports, the new detection rate
is lower, r′ ≤ r, given the properties of G.
Recall that κ(Q) is the net total social cost of misbehavior (i.e., the social harm of misbehavior
and the social cost of penalties imposed on bankers net of the gains experienced by bankers) given
the aggregate quantity of banker misbehavior Q. We use Q(n, r) to emphasize that aggregate
misbehavior depends on the number of bankers, n, and the misbehavior detection probability,
r; and in particular, aggregate misbehavior and its social cost are higher in the new allocation:
κ(Q (n′, r′)) ≥ κ(Q (n, r)).
Consider the sum of all utilities in the economy. In the decentralized equilibrium this is
(
ηαHqH + αLqL
)
p+M + (1 + η − n) ∆− κ(Q (n, r)),
where the first term is monetary payments to bankers, the second term is monetary payments to
regulators, the third term is the total intrinsic utility received by regulators, and the fourth term
is the deadweight cost of banker misbehavior. (This expression is written under the assumption
that the punishment K (z) consists of a transfer payment, e.g., is a fine. Assuming instead that
the punishment has a deadweight cost would only strengthen our result.) So the sum of utilities
in the new allocation is
(
ηαHqH + αLqL +
∑
i
(δi − εi) qi
)
p+M +
(
1 + η − n′)∆− κ(Q (n′, r′))
=
(
ηαHqH + αLqL
)
p+M + (1 + η − n) ∆ +
∑
i
(δi − εi) (pqi −∆)− κ(Q
(
n′, r′
)
).
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Hence the change in the sum of utilities is
∑
i
(δi − εi) (pqi −∆)−
(
κ(Q
(
n′, r′
)
)− κ(Q (n, r)))
= A+
∑
i
δi (pqi −∆− sqi) +
∑
i
εiφ (r)−
(
κ(Q
(
n′, r′
)
)− κ(Q (n, r))) ,
where the equality follows from (8).
Observe that δi > 0 is possible only if the decentralized equilibrium featured type-i workers
in regulation; but in this case, pqi + φ (r) ≤ ∆ + sqi, since otherwise a bank could make strictly
positive profits by deviating and offering a contract that would attract these workers away from
regulation. So the change in the sum of utilities is bounded above by
A+
∑
i
(εi − δi)φ (r)−
(
κ(Q
(
n′, r′
)
)− κ(Q (n, r))) .
From above,
∑
i (εi − δi) ≤ 0 and κ(Q (n′, r′)) ≥ κ(Q (n, r)). Consequently, the change in the
sum of utilities is smaller than the utility gain experienced by regulators in the new allocation, A.
Therefore, the sum of utilities for workers who are not regulators in the new allocation is lower
than in the decentralized equilibrium, and is strictly so whenever the (new allocation) regulators
are strictly better off (i.e., A > 0) in the new allocation. But this contradicts the supposition that
the new allocation is a Pareto improvement, completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose to the contrary that such an equilibrium exists. Consider
first the deviation in which a bank offers the contract (w˜BS , w˜BF ) =
(
wHRS + τ + εS , w
H
RF + τ − εF
)
,
where τ is such that, if εS = εF = 0, the new contract gives any worker exactly the same utility as
the regulator contract
(
wHRS , w
H
RF
)
gives, i.e., u (w + τ) Φ (r) = u (w + ∆) for all w. (The existence
of such a contract follows from CARA preferences.) Hence τ satisfies
∆− τ = −1
γ
ln Φ (r) . (10)
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For use below, note that, from the condition stated in the proposition, τ > 0: in words, if offered the
same compensation, workers prefer regulation to banking, and so a bank must raise compensation
by τ above that of a regulatory agency if it is to offer the same utility. Choose εS and εF such that
the new contract offers strictly more utility to high-skill workers but strictly less utility to low-skill
workers than the regulator contract
(
wHRS , w
H
RF
)
. Consequently, high-skill workers in regulation
will accept this contract, while no low-skill workers will accept this contract since it is strictly worse
than a contract they already reject.
By supposition, the original set of contracts is an equilibrium, and so any deviation of the
type just described must deliver weakly negative profits for the bank offering it, i.e., qHw˜BS +
(1− qH) w˜BF ≥ qHp. If that was not the case, the original set of contracts could not be part of an
equilibrium. It follows that
qHw
H
RS + (1− qH)wHRF + τ ≥ qHp. (11)
Next, consider a deviation by a regulatory agency to (w˜RS , w˜RF ) =
(
wLBS − τ − ε′S , wLBF − τ + ε′F
)
,
where τ is defined in equation (10) above. Given CARA utility, u (w) Φ (r) = u (w − τ + ∆) for all
w. Consequently, when ε′S = ε
′
F = 0, the new contract offers exactly the same utility as the bank
contract
(
wLBS , w
L
BF
)
. Let ε′S and ε
′
F be such that the new contract offers strictly more utility to
low-skill workers but strictly less utility to high-skill workers than the banker contract
(
wLBS , w
L
BF
)
.
Consequently, low-skill workers working in banking will accept this contract, while no high-skill
worker will accept this contract, since it is strictly worse than a contract they already reject.
The productivity per dollar of this deviation contract is qLqLw˜RS+(1−qL)w˜RF . By setting ε
′
S and
ε′F small, this can be made arbitrarily close to
qL
qLwLBS + (1− qL)wLBF − τ
. (12)
By supposition
(
wLBS , w
L
BF
)
is an equilibrium contract, and since αL > 0, is accepted by some low-
skill workers. So the zero-profit condition for banks implies that the ratio (12) equals qLqLp−τ , which
since τ > 0 is strictly greater than qHqHp−τ , which by (11) is weakly greater than
qH
qHw
H
RS+(1−qH)wHRF
, the
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productivity of the equilibrium contract for high-skill regulators,
(
wHRS , w
H
RF
)
. Hence there exists
a deviation that strictly raises the regulatory agency’s productivity, contradicting the supposition
that the original set of contracts was an equilibrium, and completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5: The main text deals with the cases in which both types of worker are
employed by banks. Here, we consider the case in which only high-skill workers are employed by
banks. From the main text, low-skill regulators have fixed compensation, i.e., wLRS = w
L
RF = w
L
R,
and high-skill regulators (if they exist) receive performance pay. Here, we show that high-skill
bankers receive performance pay, i.e., wHBS > w
H
BF .
First, observe that if wHBS < w
H
BF , then the equilibrium condition U
H
(
wHB
) ≥ UH (wLR) implies
that low-skill workers strictly prefer wHB to w
L
R, a contradiction.
Second, wHBS = w
H
BF is also impossible, as follows. Suppose to the contrary that w
H
BS = w
H
BF =
wHB . So for both worker types i ∈ {H,L}, U i
(
wHB
)
= u
(
wHB
)
Φ (r) and U i
(
wLR
)
= u
(
wLR
)
e−γ∆.
Since these utilities are independent of a worker’s type, they must equal one another, because
otherwise the contracts wHB and w
L
R cannot coexist in equilibrium. But then a regulatory agency
could strictly increase its productivity by offering fixed compensation just above wLR and attracting
both types of worker.
Proof of Proposition 6: The structure of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 2. For
each n ∈ (0, 1 + η), we construct a candidate equilibrium. We also show that, for any n 6= η, the
candidate equilibrium is unique; this matters for comparative statics, though not for equilibrium
existence. We then calculate the regulatory sector’s total compensation bill for each possible
number of bankers n. Finally, we use a version of the intermediate-value theorem to show that at
least one candidate equilibrium exists. The only equilibrium condition we then need to check is
that there is no “pooling” deviation in which an employer offers an alternate contract that attracts
both types of workers, as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
We start by considering, in turn, the cases n ∈ (0, η) and n ∈ (η, 1 + η).
Candidate equilibrium for n ∈ (0, η), when marginal worker has high skill. When the number of
bankers n < η, all bankers have high skill. So the contracts accepted in equilibrium are wLR,
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wHR , w
H
B . From Proposition 5, w
L
RS = w
L
RF , w
H
RS > w
H
RF and w
H
BS > w
H
BF . From Lemma
1, ρH
(
wHR
)
= ρL
(
wLR
)
and ΠH
(
wHB
)
= 0. Any equilibrium must have UH
(
wHB
)
= UH
(
wHR
)
,
since the marginal worker has high skill. Moreover, UL
(
wHB
)
= UL
(
wHR
)
= UL
(
wLR
)
, as follows.
Suppose instead that UL
(
wHj
)
> UL
(
wLR
)
for either j = B or j = R. Then an employer of type
j could deviate and offer a contract that is slightly less performance sensitive than wHj but that
promises the same expected utility to high-skill workers. Such contract would still be accepted
by high-skill workers, while still separating them from the low-skill workers, and it would cost the
employer strictly less than the existing contract wHj .
We next explicitly solve for the fixed wage wLR. Note that U
i
(
wHB
)
= U i
(
wHR
)
for both worker
types i ∈ {H,L}. Expanding, for i ∈ {H,L}
qi
(
u
(
wHRS
)
e−γ∆ − u (wHBS)Φ (r))+ (1− qi) (u (wHRF ) e−γ∆ − u (wHBF )Φ (r)) = 0.
Since qH 6= qL, it follows that for outcomes χ ∈ {S, F}, u
(
wHRχ
)
e−γ∆ = u
(
wHBχ
)
Φ (r), or equiv-
alently (given CARA preferences), wHRχ + ∆ = w
H
Bχ − 1γ ln Φ (r) . Given ΠH
(
wHB
)
= 0, we then
have
qHw
H
RS + (1− qH)wHRF = qHwHBS + (1− qH)wHBF −
(
∆ +
1
γ
ln Φ (r)
)
= qHp−
(
∆ +
1
γ
ln Φ (r)
)
.
The constraint ρH
(
wHR
)
= ρL
(
wLR
)
can then be rewritten as
qL
wLR
=
qH
qHp−
(
∆ + 1γ ln Φ (r)
) ,
and so
wLR = qLp−
qL
qH
(
∆ +
1
γ
ln Φ (r)
)
. (13)
The contract wHB is then determined by the (unique) solution to Π
H
(
wHB
)
= 0 and UL
(
wLR
)
=
UL
(
wHB
)
such that wHBS > w
H
BF . The contract w
H
R is then given by w
H
Rχ = w
H
Bχ−
(
∆ + 1γ ln Φ (r)
)
for χ ∈ {S, F}.
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Note that a bank would have to pay at least wLR + ∆ +
1
γ ln Φ (r) to poach a low-skilled
worker from a regulatory agency, which is unprofitable, since this amount exceeds qLp. Con-
sequently, we have satisfied all the equilibrium conditions except budget balancing for the reg-
ulatory agency and deviations designed to attract both worker types; we check these conditions
below. But note for now that the total compensation bill of the regulatory sector is given by
(η − n) (qHwHRS + (1− qH)wHRF )+ wLR.
Candidate equilibrium for n ∈ (η, 1 + η), when marginal worker has low skill. When the number of
bankers n > η, all regulators have low skill. So the contracts accepted in equilibrium are wLR, w
L
B,
wHB . From Proposition 5, w
L
RS = w
L
RF , w
L
BS = w
L
BF , and w
H
BS > w
H
BF . From Lemma 1, Π
H
(
wHB
)
=
ΠL
(
wLB
)
= 0, and so in particular wLB = qLp. Any equilibrium must have U
L
(
wLB
)
= UL
(
wLR
)
,
which implies wLR = w
L
B −
(
∆ + 1γ ln Φ (r)
)
. By the same argument as in the case n ∈ (0, η),
UL
(
wHB
)
= UL
(
wLB
)
.
Note that a regulatory agency would have to pay at least qHwHBS+(1− qH)wHBF−
(
∆ + 1γ ln Φ (r)
)
=
qHp−
(
∆ + 1γ ln Φ (r)
)
to poach a high-skill worker from a bank. This would give a productivity
of qH
qHp−
(
∆+ 1
γ
ln Φ(r)
) < qL
qLp−
(
∆+ 1
γ
ln Φ(r)
) , which is the productivity the regulatory agency obtains
from its existing low-skill workers. Consequently, we have satisfied all the equilibrium conditions
except budget balancing for the regulatory agency and deviations designed to attract both worker
types; we check these conditions below. The total compensation bill of the regulatory sector is
given by (1 + η − n)wLRS .
Candidate equilibrium for n = η, with complete separation of types. When the number of bankers
is n = η, all bankers have high skill and all regulators have low skill. So the contracts accepted
in equilibrium are wLR and w
H
B . Any equilibrium must have w
L
RS = w
L
RF and Π
H
(
wHB
)
= 0. From
Proposition 5, wHBS > w
H
BF , and by the same argument as in the case n ∈ (0, η), UL
(
wHB
)
=
UL
(
wLR
)
. The main complication in this case is that we have just three equations to determine
four contract terms. Consequently, there is indeterminancy in the candidate equilibrium.
Define w¯LR = qLp− qLqH
(
∆ + 1γ ln Φ (r)
)
and wLR = qLp−
(
∆ + 1γ ln Φ (r)
)
. (Note that w¯LR and
wLR are the limiting values of w
L
R as n approaches η from below and above, respectively.)
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Observe that a bank can profitably poach a low-skill regulator if and only if wLR < w
L
R. Similarly,
the expected compensation necessary for a regulatory agency to poach a high-skill banker is qHqL w¯
L
R,
and so a regulatory agency can increase productivity by poaching a high-skill banker if and only if
wLR > w¯
L
R.
It follows that when n = η, the set of candidate equilibria is given by any wLR ∈
[
wLR, w¯
L
R
]
,
together with ΠH
(
wHB
)
= 0, UL
(
wLR
)
= UL
(
wHB
)
, and wHBS > w
H
BF . The regulatory agency
compensation bill lies in the interval
[
wLR, w¯
L
R
]
.
Equilibrium existence. By exactly the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2, there
exists n such that the candidate equilibrium constructed above for that n has a total regulatory
compensation bill of M . The associated contracts constitute a candidate equilibrium in which no
bank or regulatory agency can profitably deviate by offering a contract that is accepted by just one
type. It remains to check that there is no profitable deviation involving a contract that is accepted
by both types. The most profitable deviation of this type entails a full-insurance contract, since
workers are strictly risk averse. It is straightforward to show that high-skill workers strictly prefer
their contracts to the low-skill worker contracts in the candidate equilibrium. So the deviation
must entail a discrete increase in the utility of low-skill workers. So the deviation results in losses
from the low-skill workers who accept it. Provided the fraction of high-skill workers η is sufficiently
small, it follows that the deviation is unprofitable.
Proof of Corollary 2: Identical to the proof of Corollary 1.
Proof of Proposition 7: We use B ≡ wHBS − wHBF > 0 to denote the high-skill banker’s perfor-
mance bonus. The high-skill banker is paid wHBF with probability 1−qH and wHBF +B with proba-
bility qH . We know expected compensation must equal expected profits, and so wHBF +qHB = qHp,
or equivalently,
wHBF = qH (p−B) . (14)
Now, consider an improvement in the success payoff of banking projects (i.e., dp > 0). From
Corollary 2, the equilibrium misbehavior detection probability falls, i.e., dr < 0. We will establish
dB > 0.
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If n ∈ (0, η) and the marginal worker has high skill, wHBF and B are determined by (14) together
with the low-skill worker indifference condition
(1− qL)u
(
wHBF
)
+ qLu
(
wHBF +B
)
= u
(
wLR
) e−γ∆
Φ (r)
,
where wLR is given by equation (13) in the proof of Proposition 6. Substituting in (14) and rewriting
the righthand side yields
(1− qL)u (qH (p−B)) + qLu (qHp+ (1− qH)B) = u
(
wLR + ∆ +
1
γ
ln Φ (r)
)
.
Substituting in for wLR, the change dp and associated changes dB and dr must satisfy
qH (1− qL)u′
(
wHBF
)
(dp− dB) + qLu′
(
wHBF +B
)
(qHdp+ (1− qH) dB)
= u′
(
wLR + ∆ +
1
γ
ln Φ (r)
)(
qLdp+
(
1− qL
qH
)
1
γ
Φ′ (r)
Φ (r)
dr
)
.
Given CARA preferences, we know (1− qL)u′
(
wHBF
)
+qLu′
(
wHBF +B
)
= u′
(
wLR + ∆ +
1
γ ln Φ (r)
)
.
Given qH > qL, Φ′ (r) ≥ 0, dp > 0 and dr < 0, it follows that
(−qH (1− qL)u′ (wHBF )+ qL (1− qH)u′ (wHBF +B)) dB < 0.
Finally, since qL (1− qH) < qH (1− qL) and u′
(
wHBF +B
)
< u′
(
wHBF
)
, we obtain dB > 0.
If instead n ∈ (η, 1 + η) and the marginal worker has low skill, wHBF and B are determined by
(14) together with the low-skill worker indifference condition
(1− qL)u
(
wHBF
)
+ qLu
(
wHBF +B
)
= u (qLp) .
The implication dB > 0 then follows by essentially the same argument as before (in fact, the
argument is slightly simpler, since the indifference condition is simpler).
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Finally, if n = η, we know from the proof of Proposition 6 that wHBF and B are determined by
(14) together with the low-skill worker indifference condition
(1− qL)u
(
wHBF
)
+ qLu
(
wHBF +B
)
= u
(
wLR
) e−γ∆
Φ (r)
= u
(
wLR + ∆ +
1
γ
ln Φ (r)
)
,
where wLR = M . The implication dB > 0 again follows by essentially the same argument as before
(again, the argument is actually simpler than in the case n < η, since wLR remains unchanged as it
still needs to equal M).
Proof of Proposition 8: Fix all parameters other than c, the distribution function of z, and
the penalty function K. Choose c such that θp(qH−qL)−(α+θ)c
1+
qL
qH
(1−α−θ) > c and c >
θp(qH−qL)−(α+θ)c
1+(1−α−θ) . Given
any q˜ ∈ [qL, qH ], let
∆y =
θp (qH − qL)− (α+ θ) c− (1− α− θ)
(
1− qLq˜
)
φ(r)
1 + qLq˜ (1− α− θ)
, (15)
and
s = p− ∆y − φ (r)
q˜
. (16)
Consider first the case in which bankers cannot profit from misbehavior, i.e., φ ≡ 0. Given the
choice of c, condition (3) is satisfied, regardless of the value of q˜ ∈ [qL, qH ]. Since (3) is satisfied,
and s < p, we have V RH = pqH + φ (r) − c, V RL = sqL, V BH = pqH + φ (r), and V BL = pqL + φ (r).
Substituting into (2) delivers (15). Hence for these parameter values, there is an equilibrium in
which some young workers become regulators when young; the subset of these workers who are
highly skilled when old switch to banking; and workers who start as bankers remain as bankers
when old. In this equilibrium, the expected one-period compensation of a regulator with skill qi is
sqi, where s is as in (16).
By continuity, a qualitatively identical equilibrium exists when banker gains from misbehavior
are strictly positive but small.
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Proof of Proposition 9: This proof closely follows the logic of the proof for Proposition 1.
Suppose that low-skill bankers and high-skill regulators coexist in equilibrium. The regulatory
agency’s productivity from a high-skill worker is now at most qH
qH(p−d)−(∆−φ(r)) and the regulatory
agency could instead poach low-skill bankers who would give a productivity of qL
qL(p−d)−(∆−φ(r)) .
Whenever ∆ > φ (r), then using the fact that qL(p − d) −
(
∆− φ (r)) ≥ 0 in any equilibrium
with low-skilled bankers (see footnote 19), together with qH (p− d) ≥ qL (p− d), this productivity
level exceeds the upper-bound on the productivity of existing high-skill regulators, implying that
regulatory agencies would benefit from poaching low-skill bankers (and firing some of their existing
high-skill workers).
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